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SUMMARY
The rapid growth in the number of devices connected to the network has transformed
the computing paradigm in all walks of human life, from autonomous vehicles to health-
care, industrial and home automation. The internet of things (IoT) devices help in achiev-
ing higher energy-efficiency, accuracy, speed and faster design cycles compared to gen-
eral purpose computing devices. Security and privacy of critical and sensitive data is
a major challenge for all computing systems, however, these network-connected devices
have been overlooked with respect to device-related security risks owing to lack of re-
sources at IoT edge nodes. Moreover, encryption algorithms implemented in hardware on
these devices to secure inter-device communication emit information about the key through
physical side channels leading to research challenges in designing energy-efficient, com-
pact and side channel attack (SCA) resistant cryptographic hardware for IoT applications.
This thesis investigates alternative hardware architectures for SIMON for higher energy-
efficiency and design of lightweight SCA countermeasures utilizing on-chip integrated
power-management and clocking techniques.
We propose alternative hardware architectures for lightweight cipher SIMON, at bit-
/round-level parallelism, implemented in ASIC and FPGA platforms. Round unrolling
(round-level parallelism) not only improves the energy-efficiency at small area, power over-
heads but also increases SCA resistance with deeper diffusion of the key, reduced signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) and increased complexity in modeling true leakage. The optimized
SIMON engine is applied to a low-power image sensor node to analyze the overheads for
secured communication.
Power management and low-power techniques employed in modern high-performance
and low-power systems for improved energy-efficiency modulate/modify power and elec-
tromagnetic (EM) side-channel leakage and therefore it is essential to understand their role
in improving SCA resistance. We propose lightweight countermeasures utilizing on-chip
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fully-integrated inductive voltage regulator (FIVR) and digital low-dropout (DLDO) reg-
ulator along-with all-digital clock modulation (ADCM) circuit to improve SCA resistance
of SIMON and advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption engines.
A random fast voltage dithering (RFVD) scheme with FIVR and ADCM is developed
to randomize side channel signatures to improve SCA resistance for the local supply node
of the AES cores which is exposed outside for bondwire or package based inductors. To
eliminate the need for large passives (L, C), a major drawback for FIVR, a side channel
protection scheme is proposed using DLDO and ADCM circuits. DLDO transforms the
encryption patterns when measured at the input supply node and therefore enhances the
SCA resistance. Two additional circuit techniques, namely, switching noise injector (SNI)
and random reference word (R-VREF) generator are proposed to induce more randomness.
The proposed FIVR, DLDO, randomization circuits along with 128-bit AES and SIMON
cores are prototyped in two testchips in 130nm CMOS process and SCA measurements
demonstrate improved resistance with respect to test vector leakage assessment (TVLA)
and correlation power and EM analysis (CPA & CEMA) attacks. Due to all-digital na-
ture of the proposed circuits, they easily integrate into digital design flows and are scalable
across process nodes. Additionally, the overheads associated with these circuits are mini-
mal compared to existing SCA countermeasures.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of pervasive computing has led to exponential growth of IoT devices from
smart homes to smart wearables and toys, smart healthcare, autonomous vehicles and in-
dustrial equipment [1, 2]. For remote monitoring and processing, most of these devices are
connected to the internet communicating sensitive information over the insecure wireless
channels requiring encryption and authentication protocols to ensure safety and confiden-
tiality [3]. Even though these security protocols have been proven secure against bruteforce
or cryptanalysis attacks, their hardware or software implementations leak certain informa-
tion via physical and architectural side channels such as power consumption [4], electro-
magnetic (EM) emissions [5], timing [4], acoustic signals [6], speculative execution [7–9],
cache timing [10] etc. Side channel attacks, considered to be one of the seven properties
defined for the highly secure devices by Microsoft Researchers [11], are very critical for the
security for the modern computing devices. These side channels are part of the hardware
design itself and therefore are notoriously difficult to defeat.
Several side channel analysis (SCA) attacks have been demonstrated to extract secret
key used during the security operations by exploiting data-dependent information leaked
through power, EM, timing side channels [4, 5, 12]. Modern computing systems are built
using digital gates and the current drawn by these gates when they switch is dependent on
the input vectors. An adversary can exploit the correlation between measured current sig-
nature and the input vectors to reveal the secret key. Various statistical analysis methods are
used to exploit this data dependency, namely, differential power analysis (DPA) [12], corre-
lation power analysis (CPA) [13], and template attacks (TA) [14]. Several countermeasures
[15–29] have been developed in past two decades to either mask or hide information leak-
age through these side channels. However, due to high development costs, the hardened
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security protocols are only limited to high-cost or high-margin devices [11]. For example,
ARM Cortex instruction set architecture (ISA) offers TrustZone technology where trusted
and untrusted operations are executed in two different worlds, namely, secure and normal
operatig systems (OS), simultaneously running on a single core. Similarly, Intel’s x86 ISA
defines Software Guard Extensions (SGX) instructions to increase the security of applica-
tion code and data, offering more isolation and protection to the sensitive operations using
secure enclaves.
IoT devices drive huge economic efficiencies, however, due to severe resource con-
straints and price-sensitivity, they are ill-prepared for the security challenges of internet
connectivity, exposing consumers and society to the perils of device security and pri-
vacy failures. To incorporate appropriate security features on IoT edge nodes, several
lightweight cryptographic algorithms and primitives are being considered with PRINCE
[30], PRESENT, [31], CLEFIA [32], Keccak [33], Whirlpool [34] and SIMON/SPECK
[35] being few of the recently proposed candidates for lightweight encryption and authen-
tication protocols. SIMON, introduced by National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) and optimized for hardware implementations, is an attractive option as it has
been reported to be most compact implementation among all candidates [36]. However, for
battery-operated IoT devices, energy-efficiency is another aspect which must be considered
along with area. Most compact implementations may not be the most energy-efficient due
to various tradeoffs. Additionally, accelerated hardware implementations should also be
considered to ensure cryptographic blocks not being the bottleneck for the whole system.
At the circuit and architecture level, several power management and low-power tech-
niques exist to improve the system energy-efficiency as well as performance such as dis-
tributed on-chip voltage regulation, dynamic voltage scaling (DVS) [37], dynamic voltage
and frequency scaling (DVFS) [38] and clock and power gating [39]. Integration of volt-
age regulation modules on-chip [39–41] provides very fast response to transient events
and reduces the overheads associated with switching of power states and therefore facil-
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itates fine-grain power management for multiple DVFS domains. Adaptive clocking is
another technique which eliminates timing/supply margins under variations, therefore im-
proving system performance or reducing the total power [42, 43]. These techniques modu-
late/modify power side-channel leakage and therefore it is essential to understand their in-
teraction with side-channel security of underlying cryptographic hardware. DVFS enabled
with external VR and clock source has been demonstrated to improve SCA resistance [44,
45]. However, due to slower voltage-frequency transitions, there is a limited randomization
that can be introduced, specifically for hardware accelerated encyrption engines. Impact of
FIVR and switched capacitor voltage regulators (SCVR) has been previously investigated
[46–52] and demonstrated to improve the SCA resistance at the input supply node of the
chip. However, on-chip integration of large passives (L, C) is very expensive and gener-
ally not desired for low-cost applications. Consequently, for on-package or printed circuit
board (PCB) based inductors/capacitors where local supply node for the encryption engine
is exposed outside, these countermeasures provide negligible or little SCA resistance. Lin-
ear regulators, especially, low dropout regulators which do not require any large passives,
can be implemented digitally, are scalable across process nodes, and can potentially replace
IVR or SCVR. A very fast simultaneous supply and clock modulation enabled with on-chip
LDO and all-digital clock modulation (ADCM) circuit can facilitate increased randomiza-
tion of side channel signatures to provide both point of load (PoL) regulation [40, 41] and
security [53], therefore, simultaneously addressing the challenges of energy-efficiency and
security for low-power IoT devices and high-performance computing systems.
1.1 Problem Statement
The objective of the proposed research is to explore energy-efficient and side channel attack
resistant architectures for lightweight ciphers and design of generic low-overhead SCA
countermeasures for cryptographic hardware by leveraging on-chip power management
and clocking techniques. This includes:
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• Development of energy-efficient and SCA resistant datapath architectures for 128-bit
SIMON engine; which are subsequently characterized and quantified with respect to
ASIC and FPGA implementations.
• Design of random fast voltage dithering (RFVD) scheme to enable side channel se-
curity for FIVRs which use on-package or bondwire based inductors.
• Characterization of power-supply glitch or temperature variation induced fault injec-
tion attack resistance offered by all-digital clock modulation (ADCM) circuit.
• Modeling and identification of different transformations induced by digital LDO
which help in suppressing information leakage.
• Integration of hiding circuits into digital LDO control loop to improve SCA resis-
tance.
• Characterization and quantification of power, EM and fault attack resistance through
measurement from two prototype testchips.
1.2 Organization of this Thesis
Chapter 2 provides a brief background on several topics which are essential to compre-
hend the scope and contributions of this dissertation including lightweight cryptography,
on-chip power management techniques, adaptive clocking, side channel attacks and coun-
termeasures.
Chapter 3 describes side channel analysis methods and metrics employed in this disserta-
tion to quantify SCA resistance. Also, presents the architecture for 128-bit AES (parallel
AES: P-AES and serial AES: S-AES) and SIMON cores.
Chapter 4 explores different datapath architectures for SIMON for improved energy effi-
ciency as well increased SCA resistance. Several datapath architectures utilizing bit-level
and round-level parallelism are implemented on ASIC to investigate power, performance,
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area (PPA) and energy tradeoffs. Proposed datapaths for 128-bit SIMON core are subse-
quently implemented on Sakura-G FPGA board to quantify side channel leakage. Opti-
mized SIMON architectures are then applied to a low-power image sensor node to demon-
strate the applicability and efficiency of the engine for IoT edge devices.
Chapter 5 presents lightweight countermeasures utilizing a FIVR and ADCM circuit to
protect 128-bit AES cores against side channel attacks. The architecture of ADCM cir-
cuit is presented and various sources of randomization induced from ADCM including
instantaneous frequency randomization (FR) in conjunction with FIVR loop randomiza-
tion (LR) are discussed. SCA measurements from a testchip prototype consisting of FIVR,
ADCM and AES cores designed and fabricated in 130nm CMOS process are presented
and improvement in SCA resistance with respect to CPA & CEMA and TVLA analysis is
discussed alongwith the limitations of the proposed countermeasures.
Chapter 6 explores fault injection attack (FIA) resistance offered by ADCM circuit for S-
AES. A simple measurement setup is developed to inject power supply glitch and temper-
ature variations based faults for the standalone S-AES and protected S-AES (with ADCM)
systems. Faults are characterized and analyzed for FIA under different glitch settings and
role of ADCM to tolerate these glitches is discussed and experimentally demonstrated.
Chapter 7 explores on-chip LDO regulators as countermeasures to side channel attacks
for 128-bit AES and SIMON cores. Additional circuit techniques, namely switching noise
injector (SNI) and random reference word generator (R-VREF), to randomize side chan-
nel signatures are described. Measurement results from a testchip consisting of all-digital
LDO, SNI & R-VREF, AES and SIMON cores developed in 130nm CMOS process are
presented and improvement in SCA resistance with respect to CPA & CEMA and TVLA
analysis is discussed.






Even though IoT edge devices are miniscule and perform only important processing to re-
duce the communication from a device to the host machine, the processing of the data and
communication need to be secured to prevent the edge device from becoming the entry
point into the network for a potential hacker [Fig. 2.1]. Due to stringent resource require-
ments, conventional encryption schemes such as AES or DES cannot be used for IoT-edge
nodes, giving rise to the field of lightweight cryptography . On one hand, researchers are
exploring compact and low-power realization of AES engines, for example, using serial
implementations [54–56], on the other hand, there is a growing interest in ultra-lightweight
but cryptanalytically secure encryption algorithms that can be realized in very small area
footprint and consume minimal energy. For example, lightweight cryptographic algorithms














Figure 2.1: Security threats of the interconnected world where security (in terms of security
























Figure 2.2: SIMON provides much higher flexibility when choosing an encryption algo-
rithm for a target IoT application with respect to security parameters and with its resource-
efficiency compared to other lightweight ciphers as well as compact implementations of
AES algorithm.
for area, performance, and energy tradeoffs. More recently, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) has proposed SIMON and SPECK [35], two sister lightweight
cryptographic algorithms, tailored for IoT edge devices. SIMON is optimized for hardware
implementations while SPECK is optimized for software implementations. The SIMON
algorithm is based on feistel networks. Very simple round function and key expansion
hardware makes SIMON suitable for lightweight cryptography. The high degree of al-
gorithmic flexibility enables SIMON hardware to be optimized based on the application
security requirement [Fig. 2.2].
Side channel attacks (SCA), a major threat to security of all cryptographic devices, have
been shown to be very successful to extract the secret key. Many countermeasures which
have been proposed to inhibit SCA in AES engines at significant area, power and/or perfor-
mance overheads may not be suitable for lightweight cryptographic primitives. Moreover,
there is an inherent tradeoff between compact implementation and SCA resistance of en-
cryption engines. For example, serial implementation, a common approach for compact/low-
power encryption engines, reduces algorithmic noise from parallel computation, thereby
increasing SCA vulnerability. The bit-serial nature can reduce the SCA resistance of
lightweight encryption algorithms even further. Consequently, there is a need to charac-
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terize the tradeoff between area, performance, energy/power and side-channel security of
encryption engines. While such analysis has been performed for AES engines, there is a
lack of studies on how to design compact resource-efficient as well as SCA secure hardware
engines for lightweight encryption algorithms like SIMON.
2.2 On-Chip Power Management
Computing systems have traditionally been optimized for performance driving technolog-
ical innovations and shrinking the transistors to fit more and more devices on the same die
for better integration and speeds. However, it was achieved at the cost of increased power
consumption and resulting thermal and reliability concerns. To address these challenges,
designs were optimized with respect to a power budget and at the same time several power
management techniques were developed to reduce power consumption in order to improve
system energy-efficiency. Among these techniques, dynamic power management (DPM)
techniques such as dynamic voltage scaling (DVS) [37], dynamic votlage frequency scaling
(DVFS) [38], power and clock gating [57, 58], multiple power domains are more popular.
However, to fully utilize these techniques, voltage regulators (VRs) must be integrated
on-chip to facilitate fine-grained and point of load regulation [39–41]. VRs are the basic
building blocks of any low-power system and can be categorized into switching DC-DC
converters and linear regulators [Fig. 2.3]. Switching DC-DC converters can further be
divided into inductive or capacitive based on the passive used to store the energy during
switching cycles while low-dropout (LDO) regulators are the most common implementa-
tions of linear regulators which are used for a low-power systems on chip (SoC). LDOs can
be categorized into analog or digital LDOs based on the type of feedback loop (continuous
or discrete). We employ inductive VR and digital LDO (DLDO) regulator in this research.
These are briefly described below:
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2.2.1 Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulators (FIVR)
Modern processor systems switch between multiple power states quite frequently to save
power under varying workload conditions. For off-chip VRs, parasitics of PCB and pack-
age PDN reduce the power conversion efficiency and limit the transient performance (set-
tling time for load and reference transients). Therefore, to tackle these challenges, VRs are
increasingly integrated on-chip to improve performance and energy-efficiency [39]. Rela-
tively smaller parasitics (higher resonance frequency) for the on-chip PDN allows use of
smaller passives for the FIVR increasing the power-density offered by these passives. Ad-
ditionally, the control loop for the FIVR can be run at much faster speed. This not only
improves the system performance but also drastically simplifies the integration of smaller
passives [59] on the same chip. An all-digital implementation of the feedback controller










No L, small C
Simpler controller




Intel 4th Gen SoCs
FIVR
IBM Power8TM
Figure 2.3: Categorization of different types of integrated voltage regulators used in modern
power management systems.
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2.2.2 All-Digital Low Dropout Regulators (DLDO
Even though FIVRs have smaller passives compared to their off-chip counterparts, they
still consume significant on-chip resources. To eliminate the need for large passives, low
dropout (LDO) regulators, especially digital LDO (DLDO) can be used. Compared to
FIVRs, DLDOs do not require large passives, are simpler to design and are scalable across
process nodes. Power losses for DLDOs are dominated by the power-stage losses which are
determined by the dropout voltage across the power stage (VIN,DLDO-VOUT) where VIN,DLDO
is the input supply voltage and VOUT is the output voltage generated by DLDO. When
the input supply voltage is fixed and output voltage is modified in accordance with DVFS
power-stage transitions, the DLDO power conversion efficiency suffers at smaller output
voltages. FIVRs can ideally provide 100% efficiency irrespective of output voltage. There-
fore, for large systems, DLDOs are used alongwith FIVRs (FIVR followed by DLDO with
DLDO closer to target load) for efficient power-management.
Digital low-dropout (DLDO) regulators can operate at very low supply voltages, can
be digitally synthesized and are therefore preferred over their analog counterparts for their
portability, scaling and ease of integration. Traditional digital LDOs utilizing shift-register
(SR) based bang-bang control [63] are compact but suffer from poor transient performance.
For improved transient performance, recent digital LDO architectures either have an addi-
tional loop (analog-assisted [64, 65] or employ proportional-integral (PI) or proportional-
integral-derivative (PID) controller [41, 66–68]. For DLDOs with digital PID (DPID) con-
troller in the feedback loop, the controller gains determine the open-loop system poles and




Modern processor systems run at greater than 1GHz clock frequency and draw current
patterns which vary in less than 1 nanosecond resulting in nanosecond-speed droops in core
supply voltage [43]. Traditionally, a supply guardband (or timing margin) has been added
while characterizing the timing paths for a process, voltage and temperature (PVT) corner
which leads to increased power consumption. To reduce the supply guardband (or timing
margin), several techniques have been proposed [43, 69–72] and can be categorized into
1) timing error detection and prevention 2) adaptive clocking. The timing error detection
and prevention circuits, such as Razor [72] and Razor II [73] rely on a modified flip-flop
(FF) design to detect errors and correct them inside the FF (Razor) or via an architectural
replay (Razor II). These circuits achieve energy reduction by lowering the supply voltage
to the point of first failure (PoFF) and by purposely operating below PoFF since timing
failures are very rare (∼1 error in 10 million cycles) [73]. Another approach to manage
timing failures under voltage or PVT fluctuations is to adapt the clock to ensure sufficient
timing margin is available. To achieve that, several adaptive clocking techniques have been
developed which employ distributed critical path monitors (CPMs) [69] or replicas (CPRs)
[42] to measure critical path delay under the effect of noise and localized supply droops.
These CPMs can either direct the central clock source (voltage-controlled-oscillator - VCO
or phase-locked-loop - PLL) to update the clock in presence of a voltage droop or clock
edges can be modulated locally. The response time for clock adaptation can be significant
if the central clock source is involved in the clock adaptation due to feedback loop delay
from the target CPM to the PLL. However, with local clock modulators, this feedback
loop delay can be avoided. Compared to Razor or Razor II techniques, adaptive clocking
can lead to smaller area overhead as FF design doesn’t need to be modified. In modern
processor systems, including central processing units (CPUs) from Intel, IBM and AMD,
due to severity of workload, PVT and on-chip variations, some sort of adaptive clocking or
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timing error detection or prevention is commonly employed to tolerate local supply droops
and noise events.
2.4 Side Channel Attack and Countermeasures
Timing based side channel was the first one discovered by Kocher et. al. [4] in 1996
where he demonstrated that by carefully measuring the time required to perform private
key operations, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman (DH) exponents, factor
RSA keys and break other cryptosystems. These attacks only require known ciphertext and
can be conducted in a computationally inexpensive manner. Several preventing measures
must be taken, such as constant-time implementations of these protocols, to thwart these
attacks. Since 1996, several other side channels have been discovered including power
based side channel by Kocher et. al. [12], EM side channel by Agrawal et. al. [5], fault
based side channel by Boneh et. al. [74] etc. These attacks and several countermeasures
developed to protect against these are described briefly here:
2.4.1 Power & EM based Side Channels and Countermeasures
In 1999, Kocher et. al. [12] proposed differential power analysis (DPA) to exploit the side
channel leakage via power consumption of a data encryption standard (DES) cryptosys-
tem to reveal the secret key used for encrypting the messages. Since then researchers have
improved statistical analysis techniques. In 2004, Brier et. al. [13] proposed correlation
power analysis (CPA) with a leakage model. In CPA, measured power is correlated with
a hypothetical power model [using hamming distance between current state (target) and
previous state of the circuit or hamming weight of the current state (target) of the circuit].
CPA improves the side channel analysis further. For extremely noisy or misaligned mea-
surements, the frequency domain correlation frequency analysis (CFA) was proposed in
[75]. Rohatagi et. al. proposed template attacks [14] to improve side channel analysis for
encryption engines with countermeasures. Template attacks are carried out in 2-phases: 1)
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profiling phase: measurements are captured from a device which is similar to target de-
vice for large number of plaintexts and known keys, the leakages are subsequently profiled
based on a side channel distinguisher (similar to CPA power model) and 2) attack or testing
phase: measurements from the target device are used to reveal the secret key by utilizing
the templates created in the profiling phase. Recently, several advanced attacks using ma-
chine learning as well as deep learning techniques have been presented which improve the
effectiveness of side channel attacks further while facilitating successful attacks on devices
even with proven countermeasures.
In 2002, Agarwal et. al. [5] demonstrated side channel analysis techniques, simple EM
analysis (SEMA) and differential EM analysis (DEMA), exploiting side channel leakage
through EM emanations from a software implementation of DES algorithm on a smartcard.
They showed that EM emanations can be used when power signatures are unavailable (or
difficult to acquire) and for some cases even when some countermeasures are present to
protect against power analysis attacks. The paper highlighted a key aspect of the nature of
the EM side channel leakage, i.e., presence of multiple, unintentional, information-carrying
signals.
Since side channel analysis using CPA or DPA is difficult in presence of countermea-
sures or noise, national institute of standards and technology (NIST) brought forth a test-
vector leakage assessment methodology [76] to quantify side channel leakage from a pro-
tected device which can be used to validate effectiveness of proposed SCA countermea-
sures.
After power analysis attacks (PAA) were first introduced in [12], researchers have stud-
ied and proposed several countermeasures. All these countermeasures are based on two
basic approaches: 1) information hiding and 2) information masking [77]. Hiding aims
to either decrease the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or equalize the current drawn, making
it independent of processed data. Masking relies on randomization of processing of key
dependent intermediate data during the encryption. These countermeasures can further be
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Table 2.1: Area and Performance overhead comparison for some of the popular counter-
measures at different levels of hardware design.
Countermeasure Type Platform Area Performance SCA Resistance Year
Random Order Execution [15]
Arch./
Algorithm
ASIC 15k N/A 21× 2012
Multiprocessor [16] Simulation 2× 0.4% N/A 2008
Masking [79] FPGA 3-4× 40-160× N/A 2010
Masking of SBOX [80] 8051 MC 2.5-3× 40-60% 240× 2011
PDDL/WDDL [18, 20]
Logic
ASIC 2.3× N/A >24× 2006
BCDL [24] FPGA 4× 2× >20× 2010
iMDPL [19] ASIC 18-19× 70% >100× 2007
Charge Recovery Logic [29] ASIC 3× 0% 720× 2015
Noise Injection via PDN [78]
Physical
Simulation 1.4× 0% >13× 2014
Current Equalizer [21] ASIC 1.25× 50% >2500× 2009
Clock Randomization [22] FPGA 1.1× N/A >30× 2011
categorized at the architecture, logic or physical design level. Architectural countermea-
sures target random order execution [15] of instructions, insertion of NOPs (no operations)
and dual core processor where bitflipped data is processed on another processor, thus equal-
izing the power [16]. Authors in [17] have proposed random order isomorphism which
uses randomization for composite field arithmetic in Galois Field (GF). Most of the logic
level techniques are based on differential dynamic logic (DDL) style and are dependent
on equalization of current consumption. However, these techniques (PDDL [18], WDDL
[20], MDPL, and iMDPL [19]) have huge area overheads and are not suitable for resource-
constrained devices. Physical level techniques are based on noise injection [78], current
equalization through switched capacitor [21] and clock randomization [22]. Noise injec-
tion needs additional noise generation circuitry, incurs power and performance overheads
(not reported in [78]). Clock randomization provides limited improvement to MTD and re-
searchers have developed higher order signal processing techniques to overcome the trace
misalignment issue introduced by random clock edges. In summary, most of these schemes
either have high area/performance overhead or do not provide adequate security. Table 2.1
summarizes some of the existing countermeasures and their area and power overheads. The
overheads are compared with the base design (design without any countermeasure).
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On-chip Power Management based SCA Countermeasures
The role of integrated voltage regulators in power attack has been studied in literature.
SCA countermeasures based on on-chip integrated VRs can be built on top of the underly-
ing encryption engines without requiring any modification to the design or implementation
of encryption engine itself. Additionally, these SCA countermeasures are independent of
the cryptographic algorithms so can be treated as generic countermeasures. Another major
advantage with theses countermeasures is that they can be combined with existing architec-
ture, logic or physical design based countermeasures to further improve the SCA resistance
of encryption hardware.
Due to these advantages, there has been significant interest in exploiting on-chip volt-
age regulators and power-management techniques to enhance resistance to power and EM
based SCA attacks. Telandro et. al. have shown that an LDO along with a switched ca-
pacitor converter can hide information in the load current; however, no actual attack study
was performed [47]. Authors in [48] have proposed random converter gating of multi-
phase switched capacitor converter (SCC) to provide security. However, area cost is huge
for multi-phase SCC. In [49], authors have shown that fully integrated inductive voltage
regulator (FIVR) can reduce the correlation between input and load currents. Based on
correlation studies, it is shown that input current is poorly correlated to load currents in
time domain; however, no power attack study was performed. Moreover, FIVR, although
very promising for mobile SOCs, can significantly increase the overheads for lightweight
encryption engines due to manufacturing complexity associated with an on-chip inductor.
Das et. al. [81] presented a shunt LDO to attenuate AES current consumption and with
simulations demonstrated improved power side channel analysis (P-SCA) attack resistance
with noise injection on attenuated signature. Uzun et. al. [48] proposed converter-gating
based on multi-stage SCC where interleaved stages are turned on/off in random fashion
to scramble the power signature by introducing a timing uncertainty. Yang et. al. [44]
presented measured results to show that randomized dynamic voltage frequency scaling
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Table 2.2: Comparison of side channel analysis attack resistance offered by power man-
agement and low power techniques.
Power Management/Low Power 
Technique
Complexity Area PAA resistance analysis
Switched Cap. (SC) VR + analog-
LDO
High Moderate
Protection using SC-VR. No power 
attack analysis. 
Random converter gating in multi-
phase SCVR
High High
Improvement in power trace 
entropy, no statistical power analysis 
Fully Integrated Inductive VR High High
Power attack protection from control 
loop randomization
Integrated LDO Moderate Low
PAA protection with integration 
effects and feedback loop losses
Random Dynamic Voltage 
Frequency Scaling (RDVFS)
High High
Max. N× increase in MTD where N 
number of V-F pairs
Dynamic Voltage Switching (DVS) Moderate High
Broken with instantaneous frequency 
analysis
(RDVFS) can help in designing SCA resistant cryptosystem.
Table 2.2 summarizes existing countermeasures that are based on power-management
or low-power techniques. Both FIVR/SCVR based countermeasures are highly complex
and require large area. RDVFS based countermeasures provide limited improvement in
SCA resistance [N× where N is the number of voltage-frequency (V-F) pairs employed in
the RDVFS based countermeasure]. DVS based SCA countermeasures have been shown
to be broken with instantaneous frequency analysis [82] and do not offer much SCA resis-
tance. This dissertation will propose circuit techniques and architecture to improve RDVFS
countermeasures which provide much higher SCA resistance.
Compared to other SCA countermeasures, integrated LDO based SCA countermeasures
have relatively moderate design complexity and require smaller area and therefore are very
attractive. However, the existing research work that utilizes integrated analog and digital
LDO is limited and is mostly based on simulation studies [81, 83–86]. This dissertation
investigates all-digital LDO as an SCA countermeasure and develops circuit techniques to
improve SCA resistance for different encryption engines.
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2.4.2 Fault based Side Channels and Countermeasures
Fault Injection Attacks (FIA)
Fault injection attacks (FIA) are another form of side channel attacks [74, 87–89] and can
be conducted inexpensively in a non-invasive manner. FIA relies on injection of a precisely
timed/located fault during the cryptographic operation. Differential fault analysis (DFA)
is subsequently performed between correct and faulty output to reveal secret information.
Several fault injection techniques, such as variations in power supply, irregularities in clock
input, X-ray or electromagnetic (EM) emissions, temperature variations and directed laser
beams [90–92] can be employed to deliberately modify an integrated circuits (IC) operating
conditions to alter its computation. FIA based on supply, clock or temperature modifica-
tion is low cost and easier to implement, therefore is highly practical. However, in most
cases, clock is not accessible to an adversary, therefore clock glitch-based FIA cannot be
conducted. Supply glitches, on the other hand, are easier to generate externally which then
propagate to chip internal circuits resulting in timing failures.
Software/hardware level countermeasures are incorporated to detect and correct faults
as well as to increase tolerance to FIA to ensure data privacy/integrity [27, 93–97]. In
1996, Boneh et. al. demonstrated fault attacks for the first time to extract cryptographic
keys from public-key cryptosystem (RSA) [74]. Subsequently, fault-based attack models
were applied to several block ciphers (DES [87], AES [88]). Several works have presented
fault models ranging from 1-bit to single-/multi- byte [88, 89]. 1-bit faults are difficult to
induce; therefore, byte faults are preferred. Additionally, fault models which require less
number of faulty outputs are desired. Several works have shown supply/clock glitch-based
FIA on FPGA or smartcards [92]. Existing works on clock/supply glitch-based fault at-
tacks assume that glitches can be injected in a precise manner assuming an adversary has
complete knowledge of the underlying cryptographic hardware in terms of exactly when
























Figure 2.4: (a) Timing properties of a digital circuit depend on supply and clock and (b)
may fail when supply/clock based glitch is injected.
to inject faults at the desired locations. Authors of [90] demonstrated FIA for AES on a
cryptographic LSI, however, the clock was generated externally using FPGA with precise
control on the clock edges. Authors of [91] demonstrated an FIA on ARM-based android
device. Underpowering, overclocking and temperature variations-based FIA relies on tim-
ing failures in the digital circuits. Under modified operating conditions, data may either
arrive too late at a flipflop (FF) or too early leading to setup (Eq. 2.1) or hold (Eq. 2.2)
failure, respectively [95, 96] [Fig. 2.4]. Any fault mitigation technique attempts to detect
these timing errors, masks the faulty output (under FIA) and performs the operation again.
tc2q,max + tcomb,max + tsetup ≤ tck + ∆ck,min (2.1)
tc2q,min + tcomb,min ≥ thold + ∆ck,max (2.2)
Countermeasures against Fault Injection Attacks (FIA)
There have been several countermeasures proposed to prevent FIA. Countermeasures can
be categorized in - 1) detection and correction [93], and 2) infection: propagating differ-
ence in intermediate states to multiple bytes of the ciphertext making it unexploitable [94].
Since the primary mechanism for the fault injection is timing failures, error-resilient archi-
tectures such as duplicated complemented datapath [27], tunable replicas [95, 96], glitch
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detector circuit [97], synchronous Razor [72] family can be used to detect and correct er-
rors in presence of supply glitches. Additionally, instead of stalling the pipeline for an
erroneous operation, the instantaneous clock frequency can be adapted in a pre-emptive
manner to prevent the timing failures [43]. However, major drawback with most of the
adaptive circuits is their complexity and slow response time. To prevent any fault propa-
gating outside, the adaptive circuit must respond at cycle-by-cycle speed and for an easier
integration with the current digital design flows, it must be fully synthesizable.
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CHAPTER 3
SIDE CHANNEL LEAKAGE CHARACTERIZATION
3.1 Measurement Methodology
The measurement methodology used in this dissertation is briefly described here. More
details will be provided during the subsequent chapters, wherever required.
3.1.1 Measurement of Power Signatures
For both FPGA and ASIC platforms, the power signatures are acquired across a 1Ω resis-
tor on board. Single ended measurements are acquired at the resistor node closer to the
ASIC/FPGA prototype under the assumption that due to large decoupling capacitors, the
other node of the resistor has only very low frequency signals. SMA cables terminated
with 1MΩ equivalent impedance are used to probe the targeted node. Tektronix oscillo-
scope (DPO5204) is used to capture the power signatures at sampling speed of 1Gbps and
bandwidth of upto 500MHz. An internal trigger (for FPGA) and an external trigger (for
ASIC) are used to trigger the oscilloscope. The data from scope buffer is read via a USB
cable or over Ethernet. All the postprocessing is performed using Python based analysis
platform.
3.1.2 Measurement of EM Signatures
For capturing EM signatures, passive EMC probes from Beehive electronics are used [98].
These probes have an electrostatic shield integrated in the probe loops to eliminate common
mode pickup. Two different probes used in the experiments are described below:
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Figure 3.1: Two different EMC probes from Beehive Electronics [98] with different loop
area are used in our experiments.
Large Antenna Probe - 100C
The large antenna probe has tip diameter of 1.0” and loop diameter of 0.85”. It has a 3dB
frequency of 50MHz and first resonance frequency of 500MHz. Due to larger area, it has
very high sensitivity to EM emissions but is limited in terms of capturing high frequency
signatures and spatial resolution.
Medium Antenna Probe - 100A
The medium antenna probe has tip diameter of 0.5” and loop diameter of 0.4”. It has a 3dB
frequency of 1000MHz and first resonance frequency of 2600MHz. With smaller loop,
this probe can accurately capture high frequency signatures and provides very fine spatial
resolution. However, it is limited in terms of probe sensitivity as this probe has to be kept
in close proximity of the EM source.
These probes are connected to SMA cables to interface with the oscilloscope, with
1MΩ termination at the oscilloscope side, similar to that for power side channel measure-
ment. The probe locations have been optimized based on targeted location of the testchip
for attack. Also, probe type (large or medium loop) was chosen considering localized or
globalized EM probing requirements.
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3.2 Statistical Methods
3.2.1 Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)
The side channel leakage can be modeled in terms of signal to noise ratio. It is defined as
below for measured power/EM traces:
L(x) = ε× |φ(x)|+L0 +N(0, σ2) (3.1)
where ε is the leakage conveyed by the one-bit toggle and is the signal, φ(x) is the
leakage model related to the plaintext and the key, noted x, L0 is average circuit power
due to activity of other parts of the design, N(0, σ2) is an additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN). Signal (ε) can be modeled as covariance between measured traces and leakage





whereM is leakage model based on hamming distance (HD) or hamming weight (HW)
and n is the number of bits in the intermediate variable. The SNR with this leakage model
is given as [99]:
SNR = ε/σ (3.3)
3.2.2 Correlation Power/EM Analysis (CPA/CEMA)
CPA is performed between the measured power consumption and a hypothetical model to
reveal the correct key [13]. Hypothetical models aim to model the current drawn by the
encryption hardware during the encryption and are generally based on hamming distance
(HD) between 2 intermediate variables or hamming weight (HW) of an intermediate vari-
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able. CPA is based on Pearson’s correlation defined as below:
ρt,k =
∑N





where ρt,k is pearson’s correlation coefficient for time instant t and key guess k. st,i is
the signal value for time instant t and trace i. Similarly, hk,i is the hypothetical model for
key guess k and trace i. After pearson’s correlation is computed for all key guesses k ∈ K
where K is the set of all key hypothesis and time instants t ∈ T where T is the number of
time samples, a correlation trace ρk is obtained for each k and plotted against time. The





A minimum-traces-to-disclose (MTD) metric is defined as number of measurements
required to reveal kc. We define two other metrics to quantify the success of the CPA attack
- 1) success rate (SR) and 2) correlation ratio (CR).
Success Rate (SR)






whereD is the number of subkeys, skd is the dth subkey andR(skd)=1 if skd is correctly
revealed, 0 otherwise. For our AES cores, each byte is a subkey (D=128/8=16) while
for SIMON core, each nibble is a subkey (D=128/4=32). Proposed circuit techniques are
compared wrt MTD required for 80% SR, i.e., to reveal 80% of all the subkeys (13/16 for
AES cores, 25/32 for SIMON core).
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Correlation Ratio (CR)




, k ∈ K \ kc (3.7)
where ρkc is the correlation trace for correct key guess kc while ρk is the correlation
trace for key guess k. CR > 1 indicates successful attack. For P-AES, 8-bit HD based
hypothetical model is derived between the ciphertext and the output of 9th round while for
S-AES, 8-bit HW based hypothetical model is derived at the output of SBOX operation in
the 1st round [100]. For SIMON, 1-bit HD based model between two consecutive bits is
used at output of 2nd round [101]. Each intermediate variable chosen for both AES cores
has 8-bit key dependency (|K|=28=256) while for SIMON the key dependency is 4-bit
(|K|=24=16). CPA is also performed in the frequency domain which helps in reducing the
effect of signal misalignment [75]. CEMA follows the same steps but is performed on EM
signatures instead of power signatures [5].
3.2.3 Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA)
TVLA is a standard statistical hypothesis testing methodology to validate SCA resistance
offered by a countermeasure. Leakage from intermediate variables of any sensitive algo-
rithm are detected using TVLA where the collected traces are divided into two sets (A and
B) with null hypothesis that these sets have statistically indistinguishable mean and vari-
ance [76]. The alternate hypothesis being different mean and variance. A Weltch’s t-test is
performed on the two sets and a t-statistic of >4.5 indicates leakage with 99.9999%.













































































Figure 3.2: Cryptographic algorithms employed in this paper to evaluate improvement in
SCA resistance: (a) 128-bit AES algorithm and (b) 128-bit SIMON algorithm.
are number of traces in sets A and B. All the computations are performed point-wise for
each time sample.
3.3 Architecture of Encryption Engines
This section presents datapath architecture for hardware implementations of 128-bit AES
and SIMON algorithms [Fig. 3.2] implemented in ASIC as well as FPGA platforms to
investigate the impact of proposed countermeasures in the subsequent chapters.
3.3.1 Architecture of 128-bit AES Engines
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is the de-facto encryption algorithm used
in modern communication systems to encrypt messages (plaintext) using a secret (key)
to generate encrypted messages (ciphertext). It supports block size of 128 bits and key
sizes of 128, 192, 256 bits based on the security requirements. AES algorithm is based on
substitution-permutation-network (SPN) and has complex round functions with 10, 12, 14
rounds of operations based on the key size. There is also an initial round which just per-
forms AddRoundKey (key XOR’ing with the input message). Along with AddRoundKey,
SubstituteBytes (SBOX), ShiftRow (SR), MixColumn (MC) are the other round operations
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[Fig. 3.2(a)]. Depending on the target application, the hardware for AES algorithm can
be optimized in several ways. We have implemented two different datapaths for AES- 1)
Parallel AES (P-AES) with 128-bit parallel datapath [Fig. 3.3(a)] [102] and 2) Serial AES
(S-AES) [54] with 8-bit serial datapath [Fig. 3.3(b)]. All the round operations are imple-
mented in hardware using finite-field arithmetic. For both P-AES and S-AES, the same
round hardware is re-used (round-reuse) for computing all the rounds. SBOX is the most
expensive operation of AES algorithm, therefore for S-AES, only 1 SBOX is implement to
compute 1-byte at a time and the same is shared for key expansion hardware. For P-AES,
all the bytes of the intermediate state are computed in parallel while for S-AES, each byte of
the intermediate state is computed serially. P-AES takes 11 cycles to compute 1 encryption
including initial round while S-AES has 502 cycles encryption latency. In our implemen-
tations, P-AES can only perform encryption while S-AES, due to its unified datapath, can
perform both encryption and decryption [Fig. 3.3(b)].
3.3.2 Architecture of 128-bit SIMON Engine
SIMON is based on Fiestel Networks (FN) with very simple round function. Confusion
and diffusion properties are achieved using large number of rounds for SIMON compared
to AES which has complex round function. SIMON provides high level of flexibility in
terms of block size (32-bit to 128-bit) and key size (64-bit to 256-bit) to enable efficient
selection of parameters based on target application and required security specifications.
Considering stringent area and power requirements, we have implemented bit-serial (the
most compact) datapath for 128-bit SIMON [Fig. 3.4] [103]. There are 68 rounds of
operation with each round consisting of 1-AND and 3-XOR 2-input operations . The bit-
serial datapath computes 1-bit in 1-cycle with 64-bits processed in each round. The total
encryption latency is 4352 (64×68) cycles. Both encryption datapath and key expansion
datapath is implemented using shift registers divided into left word (Li) and right word
(Ri). Li is further divided into 56-bit shift register and two 8-bit shift registers to manage
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the control flow. A round-counter and a bit-counter is used to generate the mux select
signals for selecting the bits from the upper byte (DUj) or the lower byte (DLj). Compared
to both AES engines, SIMON engine has significantly smaller area but has much worse
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Figure 3.4: Datapath architecture for 128-bit SIMON encryption core.
3.3.3 Threat Model
Throughout this thesis, there have been several assumptions that have been made about the
attack scenarios. These assumptions are described below:
• An adversary can gain physical access to the device, perform encryption/decryption
operations using his own plaintexts/ciphertexts and can measure power and EM sig-
natures. For power measurements, it is assumed that the adversary can put any resis-
tor on the power-supply path to measure voltage drop across the resistor.
• Local supply node of encryption engines, which is exposed outside through a pad for
experiments in this work only, will not be accessible to an adversary for a commercial
system unless specifically mentioned in the subsequent chapters.
• Neither Pseudo-random seed nor the structure of the circuits used to randomize
power/EM signatures is known to the adversary so they cannot find the exact pat-
terns of the output of these randomized circuits. Even though some of these circuits
are programmed externally for characterization/validation/flexibility purposes, on a
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commercial product, after characterization, the desired settings should be written on
write-only registers without external access.
• Note that an adversary can perform some statistical analysis on the measured power/EM
signatures to reveal the random pattern which is possible but non-trivial and is outside
the scope of this work.
• Power measurements are only performed at the supply node, not the ground node.
However, EM measurements capture signatures from both supply and ground nodes
and on-package/on-chip power-delivery network as well as signal interconnects.
• This work assumes first order CPA attacks and all the improvement in SCA resis-
tance results are based on first order CPA attacks only. Higher order attacks, such as
template attacks (TA), mutual information analysis (MIA), moment correlating DPA
(MC-DPA), machine/deep learning (ML/DL) attacks may/may not provide better at-
tack results but are outside the scope of this work.
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CHAPTER 4
ENERGY-EFFICIENT AND SCA-RESISTANT LIGHTWEIGHT
CRYPTOGRAPHY
With the rise of miniscule devices in the form of internet of things (IoTs), internet of every-
thing (IoEs) [2], security has become a major concern not only for these devices but also
for the entire network these devices connect to as the network is as secure as its least se-
cure device. Therefore, there is a need for integrating security features even in the devices
which perform minor tasks and may not be critical with respect to security. Considering
the stringent resource requirements for IoT devices, SIMON lightweight cryptographic al-
gorithm, developed by National Security Agency (NSA) and standardized by NIST [35],
seems to be a viable option as it offers flexible levels of security. Based on the security re-
quirements of the target application, the design of SIMON block cipher can be modified at
the algorithm level (such as block size, key size, etc) and at the architecture level (bit-level
and round-level parallelism) to meet the resource requirements as depicted in Fig. 4.1.
There have been several lightweight cryptographic primitives proposed recently to sat-
isfy the need to secure resource constrained devices. These consist of block and stream
ciphers as well as hash functions [30–35, 104, 105]. Some recently proposed lightweight
schemes such as CLEFIA [32, 106], CAMELLIA [107], PRESENT [31], PRINCE [30],
SIMON and SPECK [35, 108], can be implemented with very small area and power using
serial datapaths. However, these serial architectures lag in performance and do not essen-
tially provide energy optimal operation. Moreover, serial architectures are highly suscepti-
ble to power side channel analysis (P-SCA) attacks because of no algorithmic noise from
parallel computation. Recently, some attention has been given to optimizing lightweight
ciphers with respect to energy consumption as well as performance. Authors in [109] have

















Figure 4.1: Available algorithmic/architectural design space for SIMON enabling flexible
tunable security for based on application requirements.
unrolling techniques. Similarly, authors in [110–112] have explored energy efficiency for
several lightweight cipher schemes. With a model for energy consumption, it was shown
that energy consumption has quadratic relationship with degree of unrolling. Convention-
ally, different datapath architectures have been explored for AES to optimize for area [54,
55, 102] but very few works have focused on optimizing for energy efficiency [56].
Most of the countermeasures that exist today, either designed with architectural modi-
fications or different logic styles to mask or hide information [83] have huge area, power
and/or performance overheads. In-spite of their effectiveness, these countermeasures can-
not be implemented for lightweight cryptographic ciphers due to limited resources. More-
over, serial architectures of these lightweight ciphers, in absence of any algorithmic noise,
tend to have increased side channel leakage. Therefore, it is extremely critical to develop
countermeasures which can be easily integrated with these schemes with very low resource
requirement [83–85].
Different datapath architectures for lightweight ciphers [113, 114], specifically for SI-
MON algorithm [Fig. 3.2(b)] have already been studied for smaller footprint or higher
performance [36, 115, 116]. Authors in [36] implement a bit-level serial architecture for
very small area targeted for IoT edge devices, however, the design suffers from very poor
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energy efficiency due to long encryption latency. Authors in [115] design reconfigurable
datapath for SIMON on FPGA (Spartan-6) for varying block and key sizes. Similarly, [116]
proposes a round-level pipelining (breaking round function in multiple pipeline stages) to
improve the throughput at the cost of increased latency and area. Moreover, bitserial ar-
chitectures for SIMON have already been explored for the side channel leakage in [30,
31], however, the impact of other datapath architectures on side channel leakage has not
been previously explored. In [117], authors show that bitserial architecture for SIMON
64/96 can be protected against Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks with masking at
66.6%, and 13.4% cost to area and performance respectively. Similarly, authors in [118]
perform differential power attack (DPA) on serial implementations of 32b and 64b SIMON
on FPGA with a hypothesis complexity of 176. However, none of the prior works focus
on finding power, performance and area (PPA) tradeoffs. Moreover, an architecture opti-
mized for power may not necessarily provide optimal energy consumption, specifically for
serial implementations which take higher number of cycles to compute the ciphertext. In
this chapter, we focus on optimizing datapaths for 128-bit SIMON (SIMON128) for energy
consumption and subsequently quantify the side channel leakage for different datapath ar-
chitectures. We then analyze the application of the optimized datapath on an image-sensor
node and compute the overheads for side-channel secure communication.
This chapter explores the design space for SIMON datapath considering tradeoffs be-
tween area, performance, power, energy and P-SCA resistance. In particular, we have
investigated the role of round unrolling for SIMON with respect to energy consumption,
performance and P-SCA resistance [Fig. 4.2]. The chapter builds on several prior works in
the design of lightweight cryptographic algorithms and makes the following key contribu-
tions with respect to design space exploration for 128-bit SIMON (SIMON128):
• We have explored and optimized serial and parallel datapath architectures including
round unrolling for SIMON128 with respect to power, performance, area and energy
















































Figure 4.2: Unrolled architectures for lightweight cryptographic algorithms provide opti-
mal energy at very high performance while simultaneously improving resistance against
power side channel analysis attacks.
• We have measured side channel leakage for various SIMON datapath architectures
(using FPGA) and quantified minimum-traces-to-disclosure (MTD) required for a
successful Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
• We demonstrate that round unrolling can significantly enhance the side-channel se-
curity through deep diffusion of the input key when sufficient rounds are unrolled.
• We have compared the energy-efficiency and power attack resistance of presented
SIMON designs with high-performance (parallel) and compact (serial) AES designs.
• We have applied the optimized SIMON encryption engine into a low-power image
sensor node to demonstrate the applicability and efficiency of the engine for IoT edge
devices.
The rest of the chapter is organized as below. Section 4.1 presents alternative datapath
architectures (ASIC and FPGA) for 128b SIMON (SIMON128); Section 4.2 presents the
side-channel measurement results; Section 4.3 presents optimized datapath for enhanced
P-SCA resistance; Section 4.4 presents the application of encryption engines to an image
sensor node and overhead analysis; and Section 4.5 summarizes the key findings.
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4.1 Energy-Efficient Hardware Architectures for SIMON-128
Hardware implementations of SIMON128 can be realized at different levels of parallelism
starting from a bit serial to fully parallel. The design choice for different datapath archi-
tectures leads to power, performance and area (PPA) tradeoffs. Bit-level parallelism can be
exploited with 1-bit to 64-bit parallel datapaths for SIMON128. Beyond bit-level, paral-
lelism can be exploited at round-level with up to 68 rounds unrolled [Fig. 4.2]. Our work
explores the tradeoffs in area, power, throughput and energy for these different architec-
tures of SIMON128.
4.1.1 ASIC Implementations of SIMON128 Block Cipher
For ASIC implementations, different architectures are synthesized using CMOS 15nm
NanGate FreePDK15 open cell library and power, performance, area and energy consump-
tion values are subsequently computed.
1-bit Serial (Bitserial) Datapath
The bitserial implementation takes 64 cycles per round for 68 rounds [3.4] [119]. It consists
of 64-bit shift register (Li andRi) to store the intermediate states of round operation. There
is only one computational unit comprising of 2-input AND and 4-input XOR gate (or 3
2-input XOR gates). Two 8-bit shift registers (DU i and DLi) are required due to circular
shift pattern of the round function. These registers alternate in storing the values computed
after each round. Most Significant Byte (MSB) of plaintext is stored in DU i at the start of
encryption. The output of 8-bit shift registers (DU i and DLi) is connected to Li through
a 2:1 MUX which uses branch select derived from bit-counter and round-counter control
logic. For even rounds, Li is connected to DU i during first 8 cycles and to DLi during
remaining 56 cycles. For odd rounds, these connections are reversed. Similarly, output of
computational unit (next state Li+1) is connected to DLi for even rounds and to DU i for
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Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for Bitserial SIMON.
L: Left (upper) word, R: Right (lower) word, K: Key
DU: Shift register Upper, DL: Shift register Lower
DUi: Plaintext (MSB), nRounds: number of rounds
for i← 0 to nRounds do
for j ← 0 to 64 do
if i mod 2 then
if j < 8 then




Li+1j ← F (DU i(8), DU i(2), DU i(1), Ri(0), Ki(0))
DLi ← Li+1j
else
if j < 8 then
Li ← DLi
else
Li ← DU i
end
Li+1j ← F (DLi(8), DLi(2), DLi(1), Ri(0), Ki(0))




odd rounds. AND is computed using 1-bit shifted and 8-bit shifted values of (Li) and it is
XORed with 2-bit shifted value of (Li), lower plaintext bit (Ri), input key bit (Kij). The
bit generated is loaded into shift register (DU i or DLi) based on round counter and bit
counter which in turn is loaded into Li. The ciphertext obtained at the end of 68th round
is stored in state registers Li and Ri. bitserial datapath is described in algorithmic steps
below [Algorithm 1]. The area utilization for bitserial architecture is minimum, however,
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Figure 4.3: 16-bit parallel datapath architecture for SIMON128.
16-bit Parallel Datapath
16-bit parallel datapath has 16 parallel shift registers, each storing 4-bit data. The imple-
mentation takes 4 cycles per round and up to 68 rounds for entire encryption. The state
after plaintext is loaded is shown in Fig. 4.3. The computational units have increased
from 1-AND / XOR to 16-AND / XOR gates. There is 8-bit parallel register (Di) that
stores most significant byte of plaintext while loading plaintext, 2nd byte of Li after every
cycle and most significant byte of the 16-bit output of the computational unit at the end
of every round (new state Li+1). The loading of corresponding value in Di is controlled
with 3:1 MUX with select signal generated based on bit-counter and round counter values.
The inputs to 16 parallel computational units are derived from Di, Li and Ri. 16-bit par-
allel datapath is described in steps in Algorithm 2. Compared to bitserial datapath, 16-bit
parallel implementation occupies more area due to higher number of computational units
(no/very small change in register area) and results in improved throughput by a factor of
4×.
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Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for 16-bit Parallel SIMON.
DW: Datapath Width = 16
L: Left (upper) word, R: Right (lower) word, K: Key
D: 8-bit parallel register
if load plaintext then
for i← 0 to 7 do
plaintext← data[i ∗DW : (i+ 1) ∗DW ]
Di ← plaintext[MSB]
end
else if run encryption then
for i← 0 to nRounds do
for j ← 0 to (64/DW) do
Li+10 ← F (Li(63), Li(62), Li(55), Ri(0), Ki(0))
Li+11 ← F (Li(0), Li(63), Li(56), Ri(1), Ki(1))




Li+115 ← F (Li(14), Li(13), Li(6), Ri(15), Ki(15))








64-bit datapath has 128-bit register to store the plaintext and intermediate data (Li and Ri)
during computation of rounds [Fig. 4.4]. There are 64 computational units each consisting
ofAND andXOR gates. The inputs to the computational units are bits stored in Li and Ri.
The critical path delay for 64-bit architecture is smaller compared to bitserial architecture
due to less complex control structure (bitserial processes 1-bit at a time based on bit-counter
control logic). The encryption takes 68 cycles (1-cycle per round) and improves the latency
by a factor of 64× with respect to bitserial architecture, therefore improving the energy
efficiency and performance significantly. The steps (pseudocode) for 64-bit datapath are
given in the Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: Pseudocode for 64-bit Parallel SIMON128.
L: Left (upper) word, R: Right (lower) word, K: Key
for i← 0 to nRounds do
Li+10 ← F (Li(63), Li(62), Li(55), Ri(0), Ki(0))
Li+11 ← F (Li(0), Li(63), Li(56), Ri(1), Ki(1))





























Figure 4.4: 64-bit parallel datapath for SIMON.
Round Unrolled Datapaths
To further improve the energy efficiency and performance, round unrolled datapath archi-
tectures were implemented with varying degree of round unrolling (2-round to 6-round un-
rolling). Round unrolled architectures implement multiple rounds in single cycle. Latency
is determined based on the number of rounds unrolled. A 3-round unrolled architecture
is depicted in Fig. 4.5. 3 round operations, each logical replica of 64-bit computational
unit, are computed in a single cycle. The inputs to these round functions are intermedi-
ate states Li and Ri as well as expanded keys Ki. The output generated from each round
function is used as inputs to next round. Therefore, intermediate sequential state obtained
38
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Figure 4.5: 3-round unrolled datapath architecture for SIMON128. It is the most energy
optimal implementation with respect to ASIC implementations of all dapapaths for SI-
MON128.
after each cycle is the output state after 3 rounds of computation. For 3-round unrolled
design, number of rounds is not a multiple of degree of unrolling. So, last cycle has to
unroll only twice to ensure correct operation. This is achieved using a 2:1 bypass mux at
the output, which selects between 3-round and 2-round unrolled output based on a cycle
counter. Round unrolling leads to better optimization of datapaths as synthesis tool (Syn-
opsys Design Compiler - DC) merges the computation units and optimizes them together.
Therefore, when we increase the degree of unrolling from 1 to 2, there is very small impact
on the maximum achievable frequency (from 16.9GHz to 12.6GHz, 25.5% reduction, Table
4.1). In a complex algorithm such as AES and DES, round unrolling will approximately
double the critical path delay, therefore halving the achievable clock frequency. This is the
primary reason that benefits of round unrolling are only observed for lightweight ciphers
which have very simplistic round functions [110].
When degree of round unrolling is further increased, the benefits reduce and after r=4,
there is no benefit of unrolling the rounds with respect to energy consumption and per-
formance. Also, area is now linearly proportional to degree of unrolling [Table 4.1]. The
trend in power, performance and energy for different hardware implementations are shown
in Fig. 4.6. An increasing trend in the area depicts the increased utilization of hardware












































































Figure 4.6: Design tradeoffs for different hardware architectures for SIMON128 with re-
spect to ASIC implementations, (a) area, (b) performance and (c) energy. 3-round unrolled
datapath gives the optimal energy while offering very good performance.
Table 4.1: Comparing area, performance, power and energy consumption for bitserial,
parallel and round unrolled datapath architectures for SIMON128 from designs synthesized











1b 360 208 16 4352 11.5 3113
4b 356 213 15.6 1088 11.7 812
8b 355 241 16.1 544 12.5 421
16b 354 249 16.1 272 12.6 211
64b 336 391 16.9 68 15.4 61.7
64b, 2r 335 636 12.6 34 15.7 42.1
64b, 3r 339 1111 11.6 23 20.6 38.9
64b, 4r 339 1527 10 17 24.2 41.6
64b, 6r 337 3380 7.4 12 44.5 72
change much across different architectures, but combinational area increases with datapath
width and degree of unrolling due to bit-level and round-level parallelism requiring more
computational units. A sharp increase is observed in performance for bit-level parallel ar-
chitectures followed by very small increase with unrolling for smaller degree r. Throughput
(encryptions/second) is a function of max achievable frequency (critical path delay) and to-
tal latency (fixed for a particular datapath architecture [Fig. 4.6(b)]. Latency is reduced
with parallel architectures which results in improved performance but with unrolling, mul-
tiple rounds are processed in each clock cycle reducing the total latency by a factor of r. For
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Table 4.2: Comparison of SIMON128 architectures from this work with state-of-the-art
lightweight ciphers and traditional AES128 architectures implemented on ASIC.






PRESENT-80 [31] 80 64 32 200 180nm 1570
CLEFIA-128 [106] 128 128 176 73 130nm 2678
Camellia [107] 128 128 20 640 350nm 11350
PRINCE [30] 128 128 1 533.3 45nm 3779
FIDES-80 [113] 80 64 47 10.64 45nm 1244
SPECK [108] 128 64 1 100 130nm 16371
SIMON [108] 128 64 1 100 130nm 23584
DES [112] 56 64 144 44.4 180nm 2309
AES128 [102] 128 128 11 1163 110nm 21337
nano AES128 [54] 128 128 336 38.1 22nm 4936
This work: SIMON 






1b 128 128 4352 2.9 15nm 2889
64b 128 128 68 188 15nm 3698
64b, 3r 128 128 23 582 15nm 7375
64b, 6r 128 128 12 1067 15nm 18905
smaller r, the reduction in latency dominates the increase in critical path delay and there-
fore, the energy consumption decreases initially. Fig. 4.6(c) shows that energy optimum
is achieved for r=3 for ASIC implementations. For battery powered IoT edge devices,
total energy consumption is an important parameter and energy consumption should be
decreased per operation for a longer battery life.
Table 4.2 compares our SIMON128 datapath architectures with other state-of-the-art
lightweight ciphers as well as AES block cipher. For technology independent comparison,
gate equivalent count is compared for area and throughput is computed with respect to
100kHz design clock (all designs should easily meet this frequency). We observe that since
most of the block ciphers have complex substitution operation in each round, the hardware
cost is high and/or encryption throughput is poor. Also, as opposed to SIMON, these al-
gorithms due to algorithmic as well as hardware complexity, cannot be efficiently unrolled
to obtain higher energy efficiency. Of all the ciphers reported, AES in [102] has an equiv-
alent performance at similar resource requirement (AES128 vs SIMON128, 64b, 6 round
unrolled datapath). Therefore, an end-user can choose between AES128 and SIMON128
based on the side channel security they offer without any additional countermeasure. In the
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next sections, FPGA implementation and measurement setup for side channel analysis will
be presented and discussed for various datapath architectures of SIMON128 and compared
against AES datapaths.
4.1.2 FPGA Implementations
RTL generated for different architectures are synthesized and mapped into Sakura-G based
Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA chip to observe the PPA trend. The board has an interface for reli-
able exchange of data between Main and Control FPGA chips [Fig. 4.7(b)]. The plaintext
is sent from PC through a USB interface. A state machine is designed to load the plain-
text and key into registers, execute the cipher operation and to generate the trigger signal
when ciphertext is generated. After mapping, optimizations were done to ensure highest
frequency operation for these designs. Voltage difference across a 1 resister on the FPGA
board gives the current consumption during the encryption and energy numbers per en-
cryption are subsequently computed based on current drawn during encryption. Table 4.3
shows that FPGA implementations also have similar trend as ASIC with reduced energy
consumption for parallel datapaths and minimum energy consumption was obtained for
6-round unrolled design. We should note that 6-round unrolled datapath for SIMON128
can achieve better energy efficiency compared to AES128 (1.85× better than 128b datap-
ath and 65.2× better than 8b datapath for AES128) while offering at-par (128b datapath for
Table 4.3: Comparing area, performance, power and energy consumption for bitserial, par-
allel and round unrolled datapath architectures for SIMON128 from designs programmed















1b 499 525 250 4352 423
64b 480 757 294 68 6.5
64b, 3r 481 804 223 23 1.68
64b, 6r 481 1692 145 12 0.46
AES128
128b 1000 3302 167 11 0.852








































Sakura-G based FPGA Platform
Figure 4.7: (a) Sakura-G based side channel leakage characterization platform and (b)
measurement setup details.
AES128) or better (8b datapath for AES128) performance (encryption latency and through-
put).
4.2 Side Channel Analysis of SIMON128 on Sakura-G
To quantify the side channel leakage characteristics of different hardware architectures of
SIMON128, the current signatures were captured and then statistically analyzed to extract
the secret key. In this section, we discuss the measurement setup and measured side channel
characteristics for different SIMON128 architectures.
4.2.1 Measurement Setup
Side channel measurements were captured from Sakura-G based SCA leakage evaluation
platform [Fig. 4.7(a)]. Randomly generated plaintext vectors and a fixed input key are
loaded on to the main FPGA chip from PC using an USB interface and control FPGA chip
[Fig. 4.7(b)]. Since current consumption from serialized SIMON128 implementations are
expected to be small, an on-board LNA is utilized to amplify the signatures by ∼10×.
A trigger signal generated from main FPGA internally is used to trigger the Tektronix
DPO5204 oscilloscope (2GHz bandwidth) which captures the targeted part of the power
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Figure 4.8: Postprocessing of measured power traces with band pass filter to remove out-
of-band noise.
4.2.2 Postprocessing of Side Channel Traces
Raw signatures captured from oscilloscope have significant out-of-band noise. The success
of any side channel analysis method depends on the signal-to-noise ratio for the captured
signatures. To remove out-of-band noise, the captured traces are filtered using band pass fil-
ter (15MHz to 35MHz) centered at SIMON128 design clock frequency (24MHz) as shown
in Fig. 4.8. Statistical analysis is performed on these filtered traces. Fig. 4.9 and 4.10
show raw and filtered power traces for bitserial and 64-bit datapath architectures respec-
tively. The instantaneous current consumption from a bitserial architecture is very small
and therefore very small variations are observed in the captured power signatures. On the
other hand, 64-bit datapath architecture consumes a lot of power during each clock cycle
because of parallel computation of 64 bits, therefore, large variations are observed in the
captured power signatures. In Fig. 4.10(a), one can easily identify the clock frequency and
the rounds during encryptions.
4.2.3 Metrics for Side Channel Leakage Quantification
To quantify the side leakage from different datapath architectures for SIMON128, we per-
formed two statistical analyses, 1) Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and 2) Correlation Power
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Figure 4.10: Measured power traces for 64-bit datapath architecture (a) raw power trace
and (b) filtered power trace. Raw signatures show significant voltage variations during
round operation for 64-bit datapath as all bits are computed in parallel.
4.2.4 Side Channel Attack on Bitserial SIMON128
Bitserial architecture for SIMON128 computes one bit at a time and then serially shifts
this bit in the 8-bit registers. Fig. 4.11(a) shows two initial round functions. We target
intermediate state after 2nd round (L3) for CPA as it has dependencies on input keys K1
and K2 (no need for key expansion in first two rounds). Eq. 4.1 and Eq. 4.2 shows the
dependency of LSB of L3 (L3[0]) on K2 and L2 which in turn are dependent on K1. By
tracing all the dependencies back to K1 and K2, we see that L3[0] is dependent on K2[0]
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through a single XOR gate and on K1[62] through 3 cascaded XOR gates. Fig. 4.11(b)
shows all input key dependency paths (in total 4 paths 1, 2, 3 and 4) for L3[1 : 0]. We
understand that by flipping any bit of K1 and K2, the output bit dependent on K1 and
K2 through XOR gates only will just be flipped irrespective of plaintext. Therefore, for a
hamming weight or hamming distance power model, some key guesses will have same or
inverted hypothetical values if we include these key dependencies, leading to same absolute
correlation values for these key guesses. To negate same absolute correlation values, we
ignored any key dependencies based on XOR gates only.
L1 = plaintext[127 : 64], R1 = plaintext[63 : 0]
K1 = key[63 : 0], K2 = key[127 : 64]
L3[0] = (L2[63]&L2[56])⊕ L2[62]⊕K2[0]⊕R2[0] (4.1)
L2[63] = (L1[62]&L1[55])⊕ L1[61]⊕K1[63]⊕R1[63] (4.2)
L3[0] = f(K2[0],K1[56], K1[62],K1[63]) (4.3)























































Figure 4.11: (a) Intermediate state after completion of 2 rounds, L3, is targeted for attack






























Figure 4.12: Successful attacks for bitserial datapath architecture: (a) correlation vs time
plot shows successful attack with 10,000 measurements and (b) MTD vs number of mea-
surements plot shows MTD of 1300.
Bits L3[0] and L3[1] are processed in consecutive cycles and computed bit is written
on the same register. So, output of this register is a good candidate for switching activ-
ity dependent leakage through power consumption. Power model is derived by computing
hamming distance between L3[0] and L3[1] and is dependent on bits 63, 57, 56, 0 of K1
as highlighted in Eq. 4.3 and Eq. 4.4 and no bits of K2 after ignoring XOR only de-
pendencies. We make 16 guesses for these 4-bits (24) and CPA analysis on the measured
power traces can disclose the correct key guess (0011) based on the highest correlation
[Fig. 4.12(a)]. Since there is no algorithmic noise from any parallel computation, the SNR
is high (0.163) which is also reflected in minimum-traces-to-disclosure (MTD) required to
disclose the correct key with 1300 measurements only [Fig. 4.12(b)].
4.2.5 Side Channel Attack on Parallel SIMON128
Parallel datapath architectures can significantly improve performance (encryptions/second)
and energy as demonstrated in previous sections. Moreover, since all the bits in a round are
computed in parallel, the algorithmic noise contributed to computation of targeted bit in a
CPA attack from computation of other bits is significant and therefore, the signal-to-noise
































Figure 4.13: Successful attacks for 64-bit parallel datapath architecture: (a) correlation vs
time plot shows successful attack with 10,000 measurements and (b) MTD vs number of
measurements plot shows MTD of 20,000 indicating an improvement of 15× over bitserial
datapath architecture.
difficulty or more measurements required for performing an SCA attack.
SNR =
Panalyzed bit
Pparallel bits + Pother bits
(4.5)
We measured side channel characteristics for 16-bit and 64-bit datapath implementa-
tions of SIMON128 to analyze the impact of algorithmic noise. Fig. 4.13(a) shows the
CPA attack performed on 3-bit hamming distance between L2[2 : 0] and L3[2 : 0]. The
useful key dependency is with respect to L3 only as L2 has XOR-only dependency on K1.
Eq. 4.6 to Eq. 4.9 list all the dependencies tracing back from L3 to input plaintext and
key while highlighting XOR-only key dependencies. Eq. 4.10 to Eq. 4.12 derive key
dependencies for all the bits used for hamming distance computation while highlighting
only useful key dependencies. Eq. 4.13 combines all key dependencies to compute 3-b
hamming distance (useful key dependencies only). Please note that we could not mount a
successful CPA with 1-bit and 2-bit hamming distance models demonstrating difficulty in
recovering secret key for 64-bit datapath.
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L3[0] = (L2[63]&L2[56])⊕ L2[62]⊕K2[0]⊕R2[0] (4.6)
L3[1] = (L2[0]&L2[57])⊕ L2[63]⊕K2[1]⊕R2[1] (4.7)
L3[2] = (L2[1]&L2[58])⊕ L2[0]⊕K2[2]⊕R2[2] (4.8)
L2[63] = (L1[62]&L1[55])⊕ L1[61]⊕K1[63]⊕R1[63] (4.9)
L3[0] = f(K2[0],K1[56], K1[62],K1[63]) (4.10)
L3[1] = f(K2[1],K1[57], K1[63],K1[0]) (4.11)
L3[2] = f(K2[2],K1[58], K1[0],K1[1]) (4.12)
L3[0] = f(K1[63], K1[58], K1[57], K1[56], K1[1], K1[0]) (4.13)
The required MTD (5200) for 16-bit datapath was 4× more than bitserial design while
for 64-bit datapath it was 20000, at least 15× more than bitserial [Fig. 4.13(b)]. Similarly,
SNR decreases to 0.0419 indicating 3.9× degradation with respect to bitserial datapath.
These results show that we can opportunistically exploit parallel datapath architectures to
improve SCA resistance in addition to reduced energy and increased performance.
4.3 Improved SCA Resistance with Round Unrolling
Round unrolling has been previously proposed as a simple countermeasure for data encryp-
tion standard (DES) encryption scheme [120]. However, DES is not suitable for lightweight
cryptography and unlike SIMON128, unrolling DES comes at a huge cost to area as well
as power due to complexity of algorithm and its hardware implementation. With round un-
rolling, the keys are highly diffused in the datapath as well as during key expansion. There-
fore, there must be a stronger hypothesis on multiple key bits (more number of guesses
about the key) for a successful attack, making the attack infeasible with correlation power
analysis if the degree of round unrolling is sufficiently high.
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For a r round unrolled datapath, the noise characteristics is very much like 64b datapath,
however, since r rounds are processed per clock cycle, the sequential elements are updated
only after r rounds. It has been earlier demonstrated [121] that most of the side channel
leakage comes from sequential elements in the encryption circuit as combinational logic
have significant spurious switching generated due to difference in signal arrival times at
digital gates. This not only leads to misalignment of points of interest but also reduces the
SNR in the measured signatures. In this section, we demonstrate that with round unrolling,
we can significantly improve the SCA resistance of SIMON128. Side channel leakage was
measured for 3-round unrolled (3r) and 6-round unrolled (6r) datapaths. For 3r datapath,
intermediate state L4 was targeted at the end of 3rd round (as opposed to end of 2nd round
for bitserial and parallel datapaths as sequential elements are only updated at the end of
3rd round in this case). All the computation steps to find useful key dependencies tracing
back from L4[0] to input key and plaintext are shown in Eq. 4.14-4.23 for computing 1-bit
hamming distance between L4[0] and L1[0].
L4[0] = (L3[63]&L3[56])⊕ L3[62]⊕K3[0]⊕R3[0] (4.14)
L3[63] = (L2[62]&L2[55])⊕ L2[61]⊕K2[63]⊕R2[63] (4.15)
L3[56] = (L2[55]&L2[46])⊕ L2[54]⊕K2[56]⊕R2[56] (4.16)
L3[62] = (L2[61]&L2[54])⊕ L2[60]⊕K2[62]⊕R2[62] (4.17)
R3[0] = L2[0] = (L1[63]&L1[56])⊕ L1[62]⊕K1[0]⊕R1[0] (4.18)
L2[62] = (L1[61]&L1[54])⊕ L1[60]⊕K1[62]⊕R1[62] (4.19)
L3[63] = f(K2[63],K1[55],K1[61],K1[62]) (4.20)
L3[56] = f(K2[56],K1[48],K1[54],K1[55]) (4.21)
L3[62] = f(K2[62],K1[54], K1[60],K1[61]) (4.22)
L4[0] = f(K2[63], K2[56], K1[62], K1[61], K1[55], K1[54], K1[48]) (4.23)
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Because of deeper diffusion of input key during 3 rounds, 1-bit of the L4 is dependent
on 7 bits of input key requiring 27 guesses for creating power model. However, when 6
rounds are unrolled (6r), intermediate state after 6 rounds (L7) is now dependent on 81 bits
of input ke (including XOR-only dependencies), making CPA infeasible as 281 guesses
must be made to create a power model and then perform CPA. Therefore, for 6r datapath,
we performed CPA targeting combinational output of 3rd round with hamming weight as
power model. Fig. 4.14(a) plots correlation vs time for 3-round unrolled datapath. The
correct key bits (0100100) were recovered with 22000 measurements. Fig. 4.14(b) shows
that there was no attack possible for 6r datapath even with 500000 measurements. Fig.
4.15(a) plots peak absolute correlation for all the key guesses vs number of measurements
and we see that a successful attack is not possible with correlation curve for correct key
candidate embedded deep among all the correlation curves. Fig. 4.15(b) plots MTD and
SNR for the select datapaths. SNR degrades as datapath width and degree of unrolling is
increased. For 6-round unrolled datapath, SNR decreases to 0.0026 showing a degradation
of 63× compared to baseline bitserial datapath. MTD shows similar trend with respect
to datapath width and round unrolling. No successful attack was observed for 6-round



























Figure 4.14: Correlation power analysis attack for round unrolled datapath with increasing
degree of unrolling: (a) successful CPA for 3-round unrolled datapath, (b) no CPA attack











































Figure 4.15: Correlation power analysis attack for round unrolled datapath with increasing
degree of unrolling, (a) max correlation vs number of measurements for 6-round unrolled
datapath and (b) MTD and SNR plotted for different datapath architectures. SNR decreases
as the datapath width and degree of unrolling is increased. Similar trend is seen for MTD
with no CPA attack for 6-round unrolled datapath indicating an increase of at least 384×
with respect to bitserial datapath.
6-round unrolled datapath with respect to bitserial datapath.
Table 4.4 compares different datapaths for SIMON128 from their ASIC and FPGA
implementations on Sakura-G with respect to area, performance and energy. We see that for
SIMON128, a round unrolled design can offer both higher performance and lower energy
while providing excellent resistance to SCA attack. Also, with respect to high performance
(128-bit) and compact (8-bit) datapath implementations of Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), SIMON128 provides much higher flexibility for implementations across wide range
of platforms, specifically for IoTs with much smaller area and energy footprints compared
to AES. However, while choosing a specific implementation for SIMON128, one should
Table 4.4: Comparison of different datapath architectures for lightweight cipher SI-

























1b 360 208 16 4352 3113 499 525 250 4352 423 1300
64b 336 391 16.9 68 61.7 480 757 294 68 6.5 20000
64b, 3r 339 1111 11.6 23 38.9 481 804 223 23 1.68 22000
64b, 6r 337 3380 7.4 12 72 481 1692 145 12 0.46 >500K
AES128
128b 830 7525 8 11 43 1000 3302 167 11 0.852 6000















Figure 4.16: The IoT environment with IoT cloud and edge devices. An edge device with
encryption engine transmits secure data to the IoT cloud.
be aware that different datapaths have different side channel leakage and if securing the
sensitive secrets is of utmost importance, round unrolled datapath with a high degree of
unrolling (r≥6) should be chosen for higher resistance to SCA.
4.4 Application of SIMON-128 to an Image Sensor Node
Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology that envisions a world in which millions
of connected objects are communicating with one another, creating a wide range of appli-
cations from smart cities, smart homes to connected vehicles [2]. One of the key drivers
for the IoT environment is collection of rich information at the edge devices such as image
sensors, which transmit the processed data to the IoT cloud for more sophisticated data
analysis [122]. Due to the ubiquitous nature of IoT edge devices, the transmitted data often
includes sensitive private, confidential, or safety critical data. To ensure data privacy and
confidentiality in IoT environment, it is critical that the transmitted data from edge devices
is protected against data theft or malicious tampering. Therefore, there is a need to integrate
cryptographic functions into IoT edge devices and sensors [Fig. 4.16].
Since IoT edge devices have stringent resource constraints such as energy and area,
complex cryptographic functions can result in huge overhead for the edge devices. For
example, encryption engines with a significant complexity such as Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) engines used in high-performance processors [123, 124] are not suitable
for resource-constrained platforms due to the lack of available area and/or power/energy.
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Therefore, the design goal for a secure IoT edge device should target for minimum en-
ergy/area/performance overhead, as well as resistance to attacks. In the subsequent sec-
tions, we apply the optimized SIMON128 architectures to a low power image sensor node
and elaborate on the power, performance, area, energy overheads along with resistance to
side channel attack resistance and compare proposed SIMON128 datapaths to more con-
ventional AES128 datapaths in terms of latency, energy, area, throughput and SCA resis-
tance.
4.4.1 Baseline Image Sensor Node
To demonstrate the energy efficiency and throughput improvement, we apply the proposed
encryption engine to an illustrative IoT edge device, a low-power image sensor node pre-
sented in [125]. The image sensor node is designed to capture image frames, and reduce the
amount of the data to be transmitted by detecting the region-of-interest (ROI) and encoding
the non-ROI with lower quality. As Fig. 4.17 shows, the system includes an ROI detection
and coding unit and a motion JPEG encoder. The baseline image processing platform first
divides each frame image into 8x8 macroblocks (MBs), each of which is processed by a
moving object detection method to identify the ROI blocks in a frame. Then the ROI/non-
ROI blocks are encoded differently in a ROI-based coding unit. The parameters of the
processing units are jointly controlled by a rate controller to keep the data rate satisfy the
target rate. The image sensor system is synthesized into an ASIC with 15nm process node.
The layout of each component of the system are shown in Fig. 4.18. Area and power
consumption values are listed in Table 4.5.
4.4.2 Overhead Comparison
The system overhead analysis of the image sensor system is presented as the energy and
latency required per image frame, which has 320x240 resolution. As the ROI-based en-














Figure 4.17: Block diagram of the image sensor node.
smaller than the original image data size. The data reduction ratio is assumed to be 10x,
which is achieved for the ROI quality (SSIM) of 0.9 with typical input video frames [126].
Also, we assume pipelining with three stages (ROI processing, MJPEG encoding, and en-
cryption), so the stage with the largest latency becomes the throughput bottleneck of the
system.
Fig. 4.19 shows latency and energy of the baseline unsecured system, AES, and SIMON
encryption engines. With the narrow datapath, the AES (8b) and SIMON (1b) show high
latency, resulting in an increased end-to-end system latency by 65.3% and 262%, respec-
tively [Fig. 4.20(a)]. Also, as the encryption latency is higher than the latency of unsecured
image sensor, encryption becomes the throughput bottleneck of the system [Fig. 4.20(b)].
By optimizing the datapath, the latency of the SIMON engine is significantly reduced, in-



































Figure 4.18: Physical implementation details for high-performance image sensor node
with side-channel secure communication with NCSU FreePDK 15nm technology libraries-
placed and routed layout of individual blocks (MJPEG, ROI processing unit and 64b, 6
round unrolled SIMON)
the image processing latency, the system throughput is not affected by the encryption. Fig.
4.19(b) also shows that the SIMON with 1-bit datapath consumes comparable energy to the
unsecured system. With significantly reduced energy, the optimized SIMON increases the
system energy only by 0.5% [Fig. 4.20(c)].
Table 4.5: Physical implementation details for high-performance image sensor node with
side-channel secure communication with NCSU FreePDK 15nm technology libraries -








ROI processing unit 3,271 5,600 27.1
MJPEG 49,530 85,000 141
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Figure 4.20: Overhead and resistance comparison of the image sensor system with four
different encryption engines. (a) End-to-end latency, (b) system throughput, (c) energy,
and (d) area overhead.
Although the AES engine with 128-bit datapath also yields low energy and latency over-
head, its major drawback is vulnerability to SCA with relatively smaller required MTD
(6,000). Moreover, it has largest area overhead among the four encryption engines, in-
creasing the system area by 17% [Fig. 4.20(d)]. On the other hand, the optimized SIMON
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achieves higher robustness to the SCA (MTD>500K), with negligible latency, through-
put, energy, and area overhead (1.6%, 0%, 0.8%, and 7.5%, respectively) compared to the
unsecured image sensor system.
4.5 Summary
This chapter demonstrated an optimized unrolled datapath architecture for SIMON128 to
secure an image-sensor node for IoT-edge devices with minimal latency, throughput, en-
ergy, and area overheads (1.6%, 0%, 0.8%, and 7.5%, respectively). Different hardware
architectures of SIMON128 targeted for low area compact design to high-performance ap-
plication are explored. From datapaths synthesized in NanGate FreePDK15 standard cell
library, we observe that a 3-round unrolled datapath can provide the minimal energy (80×
improvement) while offering very good performance (143× better) compared to baseline
bitserial datapath architecture. Moreover, because of different side channel leakage char-
acteristics for different datapaths, choosing a datapath which leaks the least amount of
information is crucial for very sensitive applications. With application to an image sensor
node, we demonstrated that unrolled datapath with sufficiently high degree of unrolling
can provide at least 83× higher power side channel analysis attack resistance at equivalent
performance and energy efficiency with respect to traditional 128b AES engine.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPROVED SCA RESISTANCE WITH RANDOM FAST VOLTAGE DITHERING
Different datapath architectures as discussed in the last chapter have varying degree of side
channel leakage. However, to make the cryptographic hardware hightly resistant to side
channel attacks, a countermeasure has to be designed and integrated with the encryption
engines. Recently, there has been a growing interest in exploiting on-chip power manage-
ment and clocking circuits to provide side channel analysis resistance [44, 46–48, 50, 81,
83–85, 127–129]. In particular, Kar et. al. [128] have demonstrated that inductive IVR
with randomized control loop can reduce power side-channel leakage from a 128-bit AES
engine when measured at the input of the IVR as AES supply node is not externally acces-
sible. However, for IVRs with on-package or bond-wire based inductors [59], AES supply
node remains externally accessible and hence, unprotected. Therefore, it is important to
explore techniques that reduce leakage at the AES supply node (along with IVR input),
especially for IVRs designed with off-chip inductors.
In this chapter, we present random fast voltage dithering (RFVD), a generic circuit
level technique, for increasing P-SCA and EM-SCA resistance of AES engines [Fig. 5.1].
Instead of performing all encryptions at a constant voltage and frequency, RFVD uses a
high-frequency, high-bandwidth IVR [60] to dither the voltage around the target level by
randomly assigning a different voltage for each encryption. A critical path replica based
all-digital clock modulation (ADCM) circuit [130] transforms the voltage variations to
dithering of the clock edges to ensure correct operation while creating timing random-
ness between encryptions. Consequently, RFVD distorts both amplitude and timing of the
AES generated power trace, thereby improving SCA resistance at the AES supply node
(VAES). More randomness is added by breaking 1-to-1 relation between voltage and fre-
























































Figure 5.1: Exploiting integrated voltage regulators (IVR) and all-digital clock modulation
(ADCM) for improved resistance to side channel analysis (SCA) attacks: (a) on-chip IVR
with bondwire/on-package inductors and (b) on-chip integrated IVR+ADCM architecture
for SCA-resistant encryption engines.
circuit (GM based frequency randomization, GM-FR) to generate different frequency lev-
els (<= FMAX) for a specific voltage level during encryptions, and therefore thwarting
clustering-based analysis of measured traces. Moreover, RFVD is integrated with control
loop randomization in IVR (IVR-LR), demonstrated by Kar et. al. [128] to reduce P-SCA
leakage at the input supply node of IVR (VIN,IVR). The IVR-LR induces additional ran-
domness at VAES, which is harnessed by ADCM to further distort the power signature at
the VAES.
Our prior work, the most closely related to this work, has presented an integrated
inductive voltage regulator (IVR) with control loop randomization to reduce P-SCA of
an AES-128 engine. An IVR isolates VAES from external measurements and transforms
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the power signature before it can be observed at VIN,IVR, thereby enhancing P-SCA resis-
tance at VIN,IVR, but not at the VAES [128]. For on-package and bondwire based inductors,
the supply node of AES remains exposed/unprotected. Hence, IVR-based P-SCA protec-
tion, as presented in prior works, requires on-chip inductors to prevent external access to
VAES. In comparison, proposed RFVD scheme distorts the power traces at VAES and trans-
forms the distorted power trace via the IVR, improving P-SCA resistance at both VAES
and VIN,IVR. Therefore, proposed scheme can enhance P-SCA resistance of a system with
on-package/bondwire inductor based IVRs where both VIN,IVR and VAES are accessible.
The RFVD is demonstrated in a 130nm CMOS test-chip that includes 128-bit high-
performance (P-AES) and low-power (S-AES) AES engines powered by IVR with wire-
bond inductors [60]. This chapter will present the concept of Basic and Improved RFVD
(B-RFVD, I-RFVD) with key contributions highlighted below:
• First, we present basic RFVD (B-RFVD) implemented using an on-chip IVR and
ADCM circuit; then describe circuit techniques to introduce additional randomness
for improved RFVD (I-RFVD) scheme, namely, GM-FR and IVR-LR.
• Second, we present SCA analysis based on time and frequency domain.
• Third, we present measurement results on P-SCA resistance using RFVD including
measurements on P-AES and S-AES encryption engines.
• Fourth, we present EM measurement results showing the effect of improved RFVD
(I-RFVD) on EM-SCA.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents system architecture;
Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 will present basic and improved RFVD respectively; Section
5.4 discusses measurement setup and statistical analysis methods; Section 5.5 and Section
5.6 present the measurement results for power- and EM- side channel analysis respectively;
and Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
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5.1 System Overview
Fig. 2 shows overall system architecture consisting of two datapath implementations for a
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Figure 5.2: (a) Overall system architecture for RFVD, (b) supply and frequency depen-
dence of correlation power analysis (CPA), (c) SCA leakage suppression of an AES core





































Figure 5.3: (a) Block diagram for IVR and (b) Loop randomization (LR) circuit [20].
5.1.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Designs
Two datapath architectures implemented in the testchip are parallel AES (P-AES) with 128-
bit datapath and serial AES (S-AES) with 8-bit datapath. These architectures along with
AES algorithm are described in detail in chapter 3.3 [Fig. 3.3].
5.1.2 Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulator (IVR)
A digitally controlled high-frequency IVR [131] with a wire-bond inductor powers the
encryption core and clock modulators, [Fig. 5.3(a)]. The IVR employs a 4-bit delay-
line based ADC, digital proportional-integral-derivative (DPID) controller on the feedback
path to compensate for the loop and a digital pulse-width-modulator (DPWM) engine to
generate control pulses for the IVR power-stage. Both ADC and DPID controller run at
250MHz and DWPM runs at 125MHz enabling multisampling (2×) for 125MHz power-
stage. The small inductor (∼12nH), high operating frequency (∼125MHz), and resistive
transient assist techniques enable fast voltage transition at the output (250mV/80ns).
5.1.3 All-Digital Clock Modulation (ADCM)
The all-digital clock modulation (ADCM) circuit provides modulated clocks to the encryp-

















































































Figure 5.4: Block diagram for ADCM circuit with GM and LM utilizing critical path repli-
cas for P-AES. ADCM when enabled supplies clock to encryption cores.
The GM has two replicas of the critical paths of the targeted encryption core (P-AES has
the worst case critical path) Fig. 5.4. A high frequency VCO (600MHz) supplies the input
clock (CKSRC) to GM. GM responds to any DC change or global noise in the supply by
generating an output clock (CKG) matching the delay of the critical paths with resolution
= TCK,SRC = 1.67ns. Two programmable trimmers are kept in GM to create extra tim-
ing margin (trimmer 0) and to modulate the duty cycle (trimmer 1) of CKG. The period
of CKG is an integer multiple of TCK,SRC. The LM also utilizes two critical path replicas
and responds to local supply variations by modulating the duty cycle of its input clock
(CKG), or by gating the active edges in case of large droops. Trimmer 0 inside LM can
be controlled using a free running full length 5-bit linear feedback shift register (LFSR) to
activate clock gating randomly. The GM and LM respond at cycle-by-cycle speed. The
entire logic for GM and LM is fully synthesizable. It is placed and routed using standard
physical design tools.
5.2 Basic Random Fast Voltage Dithering (B-RFVD)
Voltage dithering has been previously used to obtain continuous wide-range dynamic volt-
age frequency scaling (DVFS) using a few discrete voltage-frequency (V-F) operating
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points [132, 133]. The proposed basic RFVD (B-RFVD) system randomly dithers V-
F around a target to distort the AES power signature while maintaining a target system
throughput. B-RFVD is facilitated by IVR and ADCM. An on-chip register storing the
reference word of the IVR is updated by randomly selecting one of 6 different reference
values. IVR generates corresponding output level after the reference transient delay.
In response to the voltage changes, the ADCM adapts the output clock period to trans-
late the voltage dithering to clock dithering. As the frequency changes continuously in
lockstep with voltage during voltage transition, ADCM prevents timing error during the
transition. The B-RFVD scheme is realized by characterizing IVRs output voltage versus
ADCMs output clock frequency. The operating voltage is randomly changed in shorter
time-scales (after every 20 encryptions), which also shifts the instantaneous period of AES
clock, such that average number of encryptions performed over a sufficiently long duration
(average throughput) remains same. Fig. 5.5(a) shows the measured voltage-frequency re-
sponse of the ADCM module for a constant VCO frequency (600MHz). Fig. 5.5(b) shows
the measured response of the ADCM to IVR output level transition from 1.02V to 0.83V
























Random skipping of clock edges
(c)
Operation of LM in clock gating and 
duty modulation mode
60ns
Figure 5.5: (a) Table listing all 6-quantized voltage and frequency levels, (b) worst case
voltage transition from 1.02V to 0.834V occurs in 60ns with ADCM modulating clock,
even during the transition, ensuring correct operation, and (c) Additional random shifts


























































Figure 5.6: Block diagram for ADCM circuit: (a) trimmer 0 inside GM can be externally
programmed to randomize the frequency corresponding to a voltage level and (b) randomly
triggered duty modulation and clock gating modes with LFSR controlled trimmer 0 in LM.
Fig. 5.5(c) shows measured waveform for LM output clock when LFSR controlled trimmer
is activated.
5.2.1 Impact of B-RFVD on SCA
B-RFVD randomly changes VAES leading to random shifts in clock edges between oper-
ations (changes in FAES) and random changes in the amplitude of power signatures [Fig.
5.7(a)]. The clock modulators also respond to transient noise in the AES supply node, in-
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Figure 5.7: Sources of randomization from B-RFVD scheme: (a) GM dithers clock freq.
in response to voltage dithering and responds to any global noise/DC shift, (b) IVR-LR not
only adds noise in VAES but also interacts with GM and LM in ADCM.
in the clock edges. Randomness from LM can be injected by utilizing on-chip LFSR con-
trolled trimmer 0 which triggers LM in duty modulation and clock gating mode [Fig. 5.8
(a) & (b)]. With B-RFVD, power signatures across different encryptions are randomized
de-correlating measured power from the input vectors across different encryptions.
5.3 Improved Random Fast Voltage Dithering (I-RFVD)
One drawback with B-RFVD scheme is that voltage and frequency have 1-to-1 relationship
and the measured power traces can be clustered in corresponding V-F groups using cross-
correlation in time-domain or highest frequency component, which should correspond to
frequency of operation, in frequency domain. The clustered traces can be separately an-
alyzed. With cluster analysis, maximum resistance that can be obtained from B-RFVD
scheme would ideally (in absence of any other embedded time/voltage noise in the sys-
tem) be equal to number of V-F pairs. To improve the SCA resistance offered by B-RFVD
scheme, 1-to-1 relationship between V-F pair can be broken with GM-FR and IVR-LR. The
difference between B-RFVD and I-RFVD with respect to ADCM circuit is the way trimmer
0 inside GM is exploited to further randomize the frequency and interaction between IVR
loop randomizer (IVR-LR) and ADCM circuit inducing more amplitude and frequency
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Figure 5.8: Sources of randomization from B-RFVD scheme: (a) LM modulates duty cycle













GM based Frequency Randomizer (GM-FR)
Figure 5.9: Additional sources of randomization from I-RFVD scheme - externally con-
trolled trimmer 0 producing different clock freq. levels breaking 1-to-1 V-F correspon-
dence.
described as below
5.3.1 Impact of Global-Modulator based Frequency Randomization (GM-FR) on SCA
Trimmer 0 inside GM has 32 taps with 16 taps enabled to create adequate timing margin.
When GM-based frequency randomization (GM-FR) is enabled, higher number of taps are
enabled with a random number generator outputting uniformly distributed random numbers
between 16 and 32. This makes sure that atleast 16 taps (default case) are enabled while
some taps are randomly added. With higher number of taps enabled, GM output clock
(CKG) is now mapped to different frequency level F (≤F1) for voltage level V1 [Fig. 5.9].
This not only makes clustering difficult but also injects additional misalignment within
each V-F group.
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5.3.2 Impact of IVR Loop Randomizer (IVR-LR) on SCA
IVR induces both small-signal and large-signal transformation from local supply node of
AES (VAES) to input of IVR (VIN,IVR). However, there is not much impact of IVR at VAES
for IVR+AES system and power signature at VAES shows similar SCA characteristics as
a standalone AES system. In prior works [128], we demonstrated that with random de-
lays added on the feedback path of the IVR through a loop randomizer (IVR-LR) [Fig.
5.3(b)], IVR-LR randomizes both small-signal and large-signal transformations and pro-
tects VIN,IVR. However, the impact of IVR-LR on VAES wasnt analyzed. IVR-LR injects
random noise at the output (VAES) [Fig. 5.7(b)] which is harnessed by ADCM circuit to
add random misalignment in clock edges and therefore power signatures are further ran-
domized. Random noise injected by IVR-LR is a function of LR frequency and is higher
for higher LR frequency. In our experiments, LR is operated at 250MHz, same as IVR
feedback loop.
I-RFVD, with different sources of randomization reduce the correlation between mea-
sured power traces to the power model by translating changes in AES supply to unpre-
dictable misalignment in the power traces and therefore reduces the side channel leakage.
5.4 Measurement Setup and SCA Methods
Fig. 5.10(a) shows the die-photo of test-chip consisting of IVR, ADCM circuit and AES
engines fabricated in 130nm CMOS. Fig.5.10(b) shows measurement setup for SCA char-
acterization. Plaintext and keys are loaded from a computer using Arduino firmware. An
external trigger signal starts the encryption and ciphertext is read back to validate the cor-
rect operation. 1 voltage setting (out of 6) is randomly (uniform) chosen in the software
after every 20 (RFVD interval) encryptions. The RFVD interval should be chosen so that
adversary cant reveal any information within that interval while ensuring low performance






















































Figure 5.10: (a) Die photo of IVR+ADCM+AES system, and (b) measurement setup.
designed to measure the side channel activity for both power and EM signatures.
5.4.1 Acquisition of Power Signatures
Power signatures are measured at VAES across 1 resistor using Tektronix DPO5204 oscillo-
scope (2GHz bandwidth, 10Gbps max sampling freq.) at 1Gbps sampling rate and 500MHz
bandwidth.
5.4.2 Acquisition of EM Signatures
EM signatures are captured with a non-invasive EM probe - large loop probe from Beehive
Corporation (probe 100C, tip diameter of 1, loop diameter 0.85, 3dB bandwidth of 50MHz,
1st resonance freq. of 500MHz) [98]. Fig. 5.11(b) shows the pad (I/O) diagram for the
test-chip. For capturing EM signatures, pads for AES VDD/VSS are targeted while placing
the EM probe [Fig. 5.11(c)].
5.4.3 Measurement Conditions
3 different systems characterized for SCA leakage are described as below:
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Figure 5.11: (a) Test-board for measuring side channel activity, (b) pad diagram for the
test-chip, and (c) placement of EM probe for capturing EM signatures generated by local
VDD and VSS nodes of AES.
2. B-RFVD: AES powered with IVR and running with ADCM modulated clock with
IVR output varied randomly in regular interval (after every 20 encryptions).
3. I-RFVD: RFVD+GM-FR+IVR-LR system with GM-FR (GM trimmer 0 settings
randomly varied between 16 and 31) and IVR-LR (LR runs at 250MHz) enabled.
5.4.4 Side Channel Analysis (SCA) Methods
Test Vector Leakage Assessment(TVLA)
In addition to regular (1st) order TVLA test discussed in chapter 3.2.3, higher order TVLA
test is also carried out. Higher order TVLA tests consider 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th statistical
moments [134]. Regular t-test can be carried out using Eq. 3.8. For higher order TVLA, the
mean and variance can be replaced with higher order central moments as described in Eq.
5.1 to 5.5. Higher-order TVLA tends to perform better results in presence of uncorrelated
noise/countermeasures.
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(1st order) µ = M1, σ
2 = CM2 (5.1)
(2nd order) µ = CM2, σ
2 = CM4 − CM22 (5.2)



























where CMn is the nth order central moment. The values for µ and σ2 can directly be
used in Eq. 3.8 to perform higher order t-test. In our experiments, we capture 120,000
signatures for both power and EM traces for performing TVLA for all measurement con-
ditions. These measured traces are divided in two subsets of 60000 measurements to carry
out two experiments to ensure repeatability of TVLA leakage. t-test is performed in both
time and frequency domains.
Correlation Power/EM Analysis (CPA/CEMA)
Both CPA and CEMA are utilized for key recovery attacks. Chapter 3.2.2 describes these
methods in detail. Upto 1 million power and EM signatures are captured for CPA and
CEMA attacks.
5.4.5 Postprocessing and Alignment Techniques
Measured traces are filtered with zero-phase bandpass filters (5MHz) to remove out-of-
band noise. A wider bandpass filter with 40MHz band (30MHz to 70MHz) centered at
FNOM (∼50MHz) is also analyzed. Filtered traces were aligned using cross-correlation
to remove initial delay (∆t) arising from use of external trigger [Fig. 5.12]. TVLA and
CPA/CEMA is performed on the aligned signatures. Fig. 5.13(a) shows measured raw
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Band=Band+∆
∆ = 5M 
5M<=Band<500M

































Figure 5.12: Post-processing, alignment techniques and side channel analysis in time and























































Figure 5.13: Filtering and alignment of measured waveforms for baseline IVR+P-AES: (a)
measured raw waveforms for power/EM signatures, (b) FFT of measured waveforms, and
(c) filtered with 30-70MHz band and aligned waveforms.
power/EM signatures for baseline P-AES design. All 11-rounds of operation are observed
in both signatures. FFT of power signature shows highest peak at AES clock (∼50MHz)
[Fig. 5.13(b)]. FFT of EM signature shows weaker strength compared to power signature.
However, EM signature shows large number of peaks with higher signal strength at non-
AES clock frequencies (IVR switching freq. and its harmonics). Fig. 5.13(c) shows aligned
waveforms for 2 encryptions.




























































Figure 5.14: Filtering and alignment of measured waveforms for P-AES with I-RFVD: (a)
measured raw waveforms for power/EM signatures, (b) FFT of measured waveforms, and



































Figure 5.15: Effect of different randomizations on spectral content of measured power













Figure 5.16: Measured raw waveforms for power/EM signatures for baseline IVR+S-AES
system.
IVR-LR can be observed. Fig. 5.14(b) show corresponding spectral content. We observe
that FFT peak corresponding to AES clock (39MHz @VAES=0.83V) is weaker now and
a FFT peak corresponding to IVR switching freq. (∼ 125MHz) along with its harmon-
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ics is also present. With RFVD, the measured traces correspond to different voltage and
frequency levels, so cross-correlation based alignment for waveforms filtered with wider
band (30-70MHz), as expected, show very poor alignment. However, with narrow band-
pass filter (5MHz), most of the waveform is aligned as shown in Fig. 5.14(c) as narrow
bandpass filter target frequency components in a narrow band. Fig. 5.15 shows frequency
spread for captured signatures for different measurement conditions with signatures for a
V-F pair color coded with a single color. For I-RFVD system, it is very difficult to cluster
the measured traces in corresponding V-F pair based on frequency components. Fig. 5.16
shows measured power/EM signatures for standalone S-AES design.
5.5 Measured Results: Power Side Channel Analysis (P-SCA)
TVLA and CPA analysis are performed on measured power signatures to quantify the im-
provement in SCA resistance for both P-AES and S-AES engines.
5.5.1 Parallel AES (P-AES)
Unlike prior works [128], TVLA analysis is performed in both time and frequency domains.
Frequency domain analysis eliminates misalignment effects. Additionally, windowed FFT
with sliding window, optimal window size/offset increases signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in
the window of interest as frequency components from the unrelated parts of the signature
are not considered which improves the TVLA peak and reduces CPA MTD. TVLA and
CPA results in time/freq. domains are analyzed below:
Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) for P-AES
Baseline System: Baseline IVR+P-AES system shows significant leakage with 120K mea-
surements with t-statistic of 197. Unprotected design is expected to leak significantly. Fig.
5.17 (a) and (b) plot t-statistic for baseline system across time and frequency respectively.


























Figure 5.17: TVLA analysis results for baseline (IVR+AES) system. t-statistic plotted


















Figure 5.18: Comparison of time and freq. domain TVLA leakages for baseline IVR+AES
system.
bands which have higher leakage in frequency domain and vice-versa. TVLA results from
time domain and frequency domain are combined as described in Eq. 5.6. To detect leak-
ages in the presence of time/voltage noise and with countermeasures, higher-order TVLA
analysis is performed. Fig. 5.19 shows leakages for order=1, 2, 3. Baseline system has
significant leakages for order=2 and order=3. For comparing across different systems, the
TVLA leakages for all orders (1 to 5) are combined as described in Eq. 5.7.
|t− statistic| = max(|t− statistic(time), |t− statistic(freq.)|) (5.6)





















Figure 5.19: Comparison of time and freq. domain TVLA leakages for baseline IVR+AES
system.
B-RFVD and I-RFVD systems: When B-RFVD is enabled, t-statistic is significantly
reduced (from 197.1 to 37.9, 5.2×). Interestingly, 2nd order TVLA shows highest leakage
as higher order TVLA analysis is mean-free, therefore, any changes in mean value of power
consumption due to B-RFVD and any changes in measurement conditions over the duration
of the experiment are eliminated. Additionally, B-RFVD system shows increased TVLA
leakages in higher bands [Fig. 5.20]. B-RFVD system has 6 different AES clock frequen-
cies corresponding to 6 V-F pairs, these clock frequencies and their harmonics are potential
leakage frequencies. For I-RFVD system, the TVLA leakage is still present [Fig. 5.20] but
greatly reduced (5.28) indicating a 37.3× reduction with respect to baseline system. Like
B-RFVD system, higher leakage is observed for 2nd order TVLA in time domain with only
two bands (380-390MHz) leaking. Table 5.1 summarizes time/freq. domain leakages for
order=1, 2, 3 for all systems. Overall, when all sources of randomization are enabled for
I-RFVD system, the TVLA leakage reduces by 37.3× and leakages across most of the filter
bands go below the t-threshold of 4.5.
77
Table 5.1: Summary of higher order TVLA analysis for P-AES with baseline, B-RFVD
and I-RFVD systems.
Design
order=1 order=2 order=3 Max
Time Freq. Time Freq. Time Freq. Time Freq.
Baseline: IVR+AES 186.9 197.1 72.8 71.8 9.2 19 186.9 197.1
B-RFVD 21.5 29.7 37.9 33.9 24.9 30.4 37.9 33.9




























Figure 5.20: Comparison of time and freq. domain TVLA leakages for baseline IVR+AES
system.
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) for P-AES
Correlation power analysis is performed on the measured power signatures. To find the
filter band with the highest leakage, a corr. (correlation) ratio metric is defined as described
in chapter 3.2.2. Corr. ratio is > 1 for a successful attack and <=1 when there is no attack.
Corr. ratio is expected to increase with increasing number of measurements. Corr. ratio is
computed for all systems across filter bands and MTD is computed for the band with the
highest corr. ratio.
Baseline System: Fig. 5.21(a) shows time domain CPA for baseline system for 10K
measurements. Similarly, Fig. 5.21(b) plots correlation vs freq. for correlation freq. anal-
ysis (CFA). Correct key guess for byte 9 is successfully revealed with only 5600 traces in
time domain and 1300 in freq. domain [Fig. 5.23(a)]. Corr. ratio is plotted against filter




























Figure 5.21: CPA analysis results for baseline (IVR+AES) system in time and freq. do-

























Figure 5.22: Comparison of time and freq. domain TVLA leakages for baseline IVR+AES
system.
has significantly higher leakage than time domain attack, also evident with >4× smaller
MTD for CFA. Additionally, freq. domain attack shows leakages in higher filter bands
which is not present in time domain attack.
B-RFVD and I-RFVD systems: B-RFVD system could not be attacked with CPA
using a wider bandpass filter (30-70 MHz) around nominal AES clock freq. (∼50MHz) in
time domain, even with 1 million measurements. However, when narrow bandpass filters
are applied, the B-RFVD system could be attacked with 400K measurements required in
time domain (60-65 MHz band) and only 30K measurements needed in freq. domain [Fig.



































Figure 5.23: MTD plot for correlation frequency analysis (CFA) for P-AES (a) baseline,
































Figure 5.24: CFA results for I-RFVD system: (a) correlation against freq., and (b) MTD
plot.
indicating an increase of 642× with respect to baseline design [Fig. 5.24 (a & b)]. There
was no successful time domain attack. Like TVLA, only few bands are leaking for CFA.
Overall, when all the sources of randomization are enabled for P-AES, measured power
signatures show a reduction of 37.3× in TVLA leakage and increase of 642× in CPA MTD.
5.5.2 Serial AES (S-AES)
To understand the impact of proposed I-RFVD scheme on different architectural imple-
mentations of 128-bit AES algorithm, both TVLA and CPA analysis is performed on the
measured signatures for S-AES. The analysis results are discussed as below:
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Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) for S-AES
Baseline System: Baseline system shows significant TVLA leakage (peak = 101.3 in time
domain, as shown in Fig. 5.25. However, it is significantly smaller than P-AES (101.3 vs
197.1 respectively). S-AES has lower algorithmic noise (all the bytes are processed seri-
ally) compared to P-AES (higher algorithmic noise). However, because of very small volt-
age drops, it is difficult to detect rounds and therefore, it is difficult to align the rounds/clock
cycles with cross-correlation compared to P-AES where all the rounds are very distinct.
Additionally, since TVLA leakage is analyzed in the middle rounds of encryption opera-
tion, S-AES has significant clock drift where clock jitter is accumulated over many clock
cycles from the start of the trigger (encryption latency of 502 cycles for S-AES). P-AES


























Figure 5.25: Log of —t-statistic— plotted against filter bands. S-AES shows significant
leakage even for I-RFVD system.
Table 5.2: Comparison of high order TVLA leakages for order=1, 2, 3 for baseline, B-
RFVD, and I-RFVD systems for S-AES.
Design
order=1 order=2 order=3 Max
Time Freq. Time Freq. Time Freq. Time Freq.
Baseline 101.3 91.1 50.4 40.8 20.8 10.5 101.3 91.1
B-RFVD 24.3 41.66 24.2 31.7 7.65 22.28 24.3 41.66
I-RFVD 13.3 22.5 25.3 30.6 11.6 26.6 25.3 30.6
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B-RFVD and I-RFVD systems: With B-RFVD, t-statistic is significantly reduced
(from 101.3 to 41.66, 2.43× reduction). For I-RFVD system, the S-AES engine still leaks
significantly (2nd order TVLA peak of 30.6) across multiple bands indicating limited reduc-
tion in TVLA peak (3.33×) compared to baseline system [Fig. 5.25]. Table 5.2 summarizes
the TVLA leakages for S-AES across time and freq. domains for order=1, 2, 3 for all the
systems.
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) for S-AES
Byte 3 is found to be having the smallest MTD with respect to baseline system and is
therefore targeted for CPA attack across all systems.
Baseline System: Baseline system for S-AES shows very small MTD in freq. domain
(MTD=2100) [Fig. 5.26)].
B-RFVD and I-RFVD systems: When B-RFVD is enabled, MTD for S-AES increases
to 700K (by 333× with respect to baseline) indicating significantly reduced leakage with
respect to CPA [Fig. 5.27(a)]. For I-RFVD system, MTD further increases to 900K (428×
increase) with respect to baseline system [Fig. 5.27(b)]. In summary, even though S-AES























































Figure 5.27: CFA results for S-AES. MTD plots for: (a) B-RFVD, and (b) I-RFVD sys-
tems.
5.6 Measured Results: EM Side Channel Analysis (EM-SCA)
Electromagnetic emanations from CMOS devices and on-chip, on-package PDN network
have been shown to carry multiple, unintentional side channel signals [5] which can be
exploited to break proven countermeasures targeting power side channel. [135] demon-
strated that IVR-LR can also mask EM signatures generated by AES in the proximity of
IVR inductor due to constant switching of the power-stage and inductor current. We inves-
tigate how the proposed B-RFVD and I-RFVD schemes impact EM side channel analysis
(EM-SCA) attacks near AES VDD/VSS pads.
5.6.1 Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA)
TVLA for P-AES
Fig. 5.28 plots t-statistic for P-AES against filter bands for baseline, B-RFVD and I-RFVD
systems. As expected, baseline has the highest t-statistic (97.9) with 120-125 MHz (IVR
switching freq.) highest leaking band. With B-RFVD, the TVLA peak reduces to 33 (2.97×
reduction). Both baseline and B-RFVD show very high TVLA leakages across most of the
bands indicating presence of multiple leakage sources. For I-RFVD system, the TVLA


























Figure 5.28: —t-statistic— plotted against filter bands for EM signatures. P-AES shows
highly reduced leakage for I-RFVD system.
to baseline system.
TVLA for S-AES
Fig. 5.29 plots t-statistic for S-AES across filter bands for baseline, B-RFVD and I-RFVD
systems. Baseline has the highest t-statistic (78) with 120-125 MHz highest leaking band.
With B-RFVD, the TVLA peak reduces only slightly to 49.3 (1.58× reduction). For I-
RFVD, the TVLA peak is 8.92 (2nd order TVLA, freq. domain) indicating a reduction of
8.8× . Like P-AES, S-AES also leaks significantly across the entire spectrum for baseline,
B-RFVD and I-RFVD systems.
5.6.2 Correlation EM Analysis (CEMA)
CEMA for P-AES
Fig. 5.30(a) shows MTD plot for I-RFVD system. The MTD required for successful
CEMA is 900K with 45-50MHz filter band [11.3× higher than baseline]. Even though





























Figure 5.29: —t-statistic— plotted against filter bands for EM signatures. S-AES shows
significant leakage even for I-RFVD system.
CEMA for S-AES
Fig. 5.30(b) shows MTD plot for I-RFVD system. The measurements required for a suc-
cessful CEMA is only 400K for 5-10 MHz band [improvement of only 2.5×with respect to




































Figure 5.30: CEMA for I-RFVD system for: (a) P-AES, (b) S-AES.
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5.6.3 Comparison of P-SCA and EM-SCA
Results presented in chapter 5.5 and 5.6 have shown that both power and EM signatures
can be captured to perform a successful key recovery attack. An adversary can follow the
path of least resistance and choose power/EM side channels based on their relative success
to break the proposed countermeasures. This Section compares P-SCA and EM-SCA with
respect to TVLA peaks and MTD required for a successful CPA/CEMA attack.
The extent of TVLA leakage is quantified with respect to highest peak for —t-statistic—
and minimum-traces-to-detect-leakage (MTDL, |t−statistic|≥ 4.5). Table 5.3 lists TVLA
peak/MTDL and CPA/CEMA MTD for P-AES/S-AES across all measurement conditions.
We observe that for unprotected baseline P-AES, P-SCA performs much better than EM-
SCA. However, when different sources of randomization are enabled which directly af-
fect the power consumption in amplitude and time, EM-SCA starts performing equivalent
to/better than P-SCA. TVLA peak and MTDL both show significant side channel leakages
for EM-SCA which are not present for P-SCA for the I-RFVD system.
A slightly different trend for S-AES is seen where TVLA peak leakage with EM-SCA
is considerably lower compared to P-SCA for most cases as well as for I-RFVD system.
However, TVLA MTDL show similar behavior as P-SCA while CEMA MTD when coun-
termeasures are enabled is observed to be significantly less compared to CPA MTD.

















Baseline 1.3K 197.1 20 80K 97.9 100
B-RFVD 30K 37.9 1.5K 300K 33 2K















2.1K 101.3 60 160K 78 140
700K 41.7 1K 300K 49.3 1K
900K 30.6 4K 400K 8.9 4K
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5.6.4 Overheads of the Proposed Scheme
Performance Overheads
For B-RFVD, the performance overhead is computed using fixed system throughput. The
average operating freq. for B-RFVD is same as the baseline case, however, there is some
performance degradation due to finite transition time of IVR (60ns after every 20 encryp-
tions, throughput reduces from 578Mbps to 571Mbps, 1.3% degradation). For I-RFVD,
the system is run at≤ FMAX with GM-FR. e.g., for nominal case, with varying GM trimmer
0 settings, ∼5 freq. levels (49.7MHz to 37.5MHz) are generated leading to -14.4% perfor-
mance degradation on an average. With IVR-LR, FMAX for nominal case decreases from
49.7MHz to 49.1MHz (1.2% degradation, ADCM recovers some performance degradation
by clock adaptation compared to [128]).
Power Overheads
The power consumption for AES operating at 49.7MHz @0.89V is 13.1mW. The mea-
sured power overheads due to ADCM circuit and B-RFVD scheme are 291µW (2.9%), and
380µW (3%) respectively. For I-RFVD, with GM-FR, since average freq. of operation is
reduced, power reduces (-14.4% @49.7MHz, 0.89V). IVR-LR contributes 5% additional
power.
Area Overheads
ADCM circuit (including B-RFVD blocks and GM-FR) consumes 11106µm2 area while
IVR-LR occupies 2135 µm2 (total 6.6% of AES area).
Comparison with Existing SCA Countermeasures
Table 5.4 compares I-RFVD with prior work on increasing SCA resistance, focusing on
circuit/logic level countermeasures which are similar in nature and have small overheads.
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Table 5.4: Comparison of proposed I-RFVD scheme with existing countermeasures.













Technology 130nm 130nm 65nm 130nm








Area 6.6% 1% +25% 33%
Power -3.5% +5% -30% 20%
Perf. -17.4% -3.33% 0% -50%
# of Measurements 1,000,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000
SCA Analysis Method(s) CPA, CEMA, TVLA CPA, TVLA DPA DPA
Supply Node Protected VAES, VIN,IVR VIN, IVR VIN, IC VIN, IC
Architecture/algorithm-level techniques such as masking and threshold implementations
eliminate leakage however are very different in nature and have very high overheads [26,
28] and therefore havent been compared with. Unlike the prior work by Kar et. al. [[128],
I-RFVD greatly reduces side channel leakage at both VIN,IVR and VAES nodes. I-RFVD
can be used in conjunction with other SCA countermeasures based on on-chip switched
capacitor [21] and charge recovery logic [29] to further improve SCA resistance. The
proposed I-RFVD based countermeasure is essentially an information hiding countermea-
sure. However, due to its generic nature and low complexity it can also be combined with
any leakage elimination countermeasure such as masking and threshold implementations,
which on their own have been shown to be susceptible to higher order attacks [26, 28], to
further improve the SCA resistance.
5.6.5 Discussion
Proposed I-RFVD scheme relies on randomization of amplitude and timing of acquired
power/EM signatures and therefore, offers only mitigation against SCA attacks, unlike
threshold implementation and masking-based countermeasures which eliminate leakage
[26, 28]. However, the advantage of I-RFVD scheme is its less complexity and generic-
ity making it easily integrable with any underlying cryptographic circuit without any need
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for modification. We have performed experiments on hardware implementations of AES
algorithm only and observed significantly different SCA leakage characteristics for P-AES
and S-AES. S-AES due to its serial datapath (8-bit) has higher signal-to-noise ratio with re-
spect to CPA/CEMA where a byte is targeted for attack at a time. However with respect to
TVLA, all bits that are switching at a time are considered as signal (128-bit for P-AES and
8-bit for S-AES) indicating higher SNR during the targeted round for P-AES (1-cycle) and
lower SNR for S-AES (16-cycles for SBOX operation) as the signal is temporally spread
due to 8-bit datapath. This leads to higher TVLA leakage for P-AES for the baseline system
vs S-AES. However, due to spreading of TVLA leakage for S-AES across multiple cycles,
I-RFVD scheme and randomization-based countermeasures in general are not that effective
with respect to TVLA as randomization will have different impact on each of these clock
cycles, with some cycles still leaking significantly more even when other cycles have sig-
nificantly reduced leakage with B-RFVD and I-RFVD systems. Therefore, for encryption
schemes such as lightweight ciphers [101], public key encryption algorithms (ECC, RSA),
the proposed countermeasure may not be as effective as they leak over multiple cycles.
Since, I-RFVD induces noise in the amplitude of power signatures with pseudo-random
pattern via IVR-LR and ADCM circuits, more advanced attacks (template, machine/deep
learning) can be performed with a profiling step to detect the pattern and reduce the effect
of I-RFVD scheme. Similarly, leakage power analysis attacks [136] can be investigated
as leakage power only depends on the state of the circuit and is not dependent on the fre-
quency of operation rendering frequency randomization ineffective. Similarly, even though
authors have employed very extensive filtering schemes consisting of narrow bandpass fil-
ters across a wide frequency range in both time and frequency domains, the optimal linear
filter can be obtained with a profiling step [137] which may improve the attack methods
presented in this chapter. It will be interesting to develop better attack methods in future to
break the I-RFVD scheme compared to the attack methods presented here. We also plan
to develop theoretical models for the proposed schemes to predict and correlate measured
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results with theoretical simulations/estimations.
5.7 Summary
The chapter demonstrates enhanced power/EM side channel analysis attack resistance of
encryption engines using RFVD enabled by on-package inductor based high frequency IVR
with loop randomizations and all-digital clock modulation. With SCA analysis performed
on power/EM signatures captured from a test-chip fabricated in 130nm CMOS, we observe
that even though proposed I-RFVD scheme can suppress side channel leakage present in
frequency bands in proximity of AES clock, higher/lower frequency bands still tend to leak
sensitive information, specifically via EM signatures which are emanated from multiple
sources. However, the proposed scheme can be easily integrated on-chip without much
area, power/performance overheads and provide substantial reduction in both power (upto
37.3× reduction in TVLA leakage and 642× increase in CPA MTD) and EM side channel
leakage (upto 11.8× reduction in TVLA leakage and 11.3× increase in CEMA MTD).
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CHAPTER 6
FAULT ATTACK MITIGATION WITH ALL-DIGITAL CLOCK MODULATION
CIRCUIT
The prior works to prevent FIA for a cryptographic ASIC hardware accelerator with timing
error detection circuits are primarily based on simulation studies [95, 96] and do not present
experimental (hardware) results. This work considers a high-speed and fully-synthesizable
ASIC implementation of ADCM circuit [Fig. 5.4] [130] with 130nm CMOS and demon-
strates fault mitigation with measured results. ADCM adapts to both DC and AC variations
in power supply to generate an output clock for the target digital core implementing 128-
bit AES (AES-128) algorithm using 8-bit serial datapath (S-AES). In this chapter, we will
first present a methodology to inject supply glitches without any assumption about accurate
timing (cycle-by-cycle) of the AES operations. We then demonstrate that with ADCM cir-
cuit, one can no longer inject faults with supply glitches even after 10-million encryptions
across varying operating conditions (voltage and VCO frequency, temperature variations).
We further show that in extreme operating conditions, ADCM stops generating any clock
edges leading to complete failure of AES operation, therefore no exploitable faults can be
injected.
6.1 System Overview and Implementation
The proposed system consists of an ASIC implementation of a 128-bit AES engine with 8-
bit serial datapath (S-AES) as described in Fig. 3.3(b) and ADCM circuit [Fig. 5.4] [138].
A glitch injection circuit consisting of externally controllable resistor elements is integrated
on-chip to inject supply glitches of variable height and width [Fig. 6.1]. For ADCM
circuit, a 32-tap programmable trimmer (trimmer 0) controlled with 5-bit SEL TM signal







































Figure 6.1: System architecture of ADCM circuit to prevent supply glitch and temperature
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Figure 6.2: (a) Fully synthesizable design flow to implement ADCM circuit and (b) worst
case timing critical path for S-AES extracted from post-layout STA.
trimmer (trimmer 1) is used to get the desired duty cycle. Moreover, Both GM and LM
use sense-amplifier (SA) based flip-flops and latches to minimize metastability conditions.
Unlike existing timing error prevention circuits [43, 72], ADCM circuit (GM) can respond
to DC changes in supply voltages making it ideal for implementing dynamic voltage and
frequency scaling algorithms on-chip [100, 129]. The entire logic for GM and LM is fully
synthesizable. Gate-level netlist for all critical path replicas (CPR0..3) is extracted using a
critical path extractor script from post-layout static-timing-analysis (STA) and is integrated
with rest of the GM/LM gate-level netlist before it is placed and routed using standard
physical design tools [Fig. 6.2 (a) & (b)].
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6.2 Experimental Setup
The same testchip that we presented in Chapter 5 is used to carry out FIA experiments.
The relevant components that are used for FIA work is marked in Fig. 6.3 (b). Table
6.1 provides a summary for the testchip. Fig. 6.3 (a) shows the measurement setup. An
external start signal starts the encryption and ciphertext is read back for validation and DFA
[Fig. 6.4].
An on-chip circuit with 4 NMOSs (binary sized - W, 2W, 4W, 8W) is used to induce
supply glitches [Fig. 6.1. All NMOSs can be turned on/off with a 4-bit external glitch level
(glitch lvl[3:0]) signal to modulate the height of the induced supply glitch. Additionally,
a glitch enable control is used to send narrow pulses to enable/disable these NMOSs to
induce supply glitch with varying height and width (glitch profile depends on width of
narrow pulse and on-chip decoupling capacitor). The clock for the test-chip is generated
internally using a free-running VCO. The AES can operate in the standalone mode with a















































Figure 6.3: (a) Measurement setup with testchip and PCB integrated with Sakura-G FPGA



































































Figure 6.4: Measurement setup for fault injection- Sakura-G platform integrated with
















































Figure 6.5: timing diagram for glitch enable generation with respect to AES encryption.
mode, where the AES clock comes from the ADCM circuit. In the protected mode, the




























Figure 6.6: (a) Unprotected standalone AES and (b) AES protected with on-chip ADCM
circuit are analyzed with respect to FIA.
Table 6.1: Summary of testchip with respect to S-AES, ADCM, VCO circuits.
S-AES
Core
Area 320µm 360µm (6592 gates)
Perf.
Latency: 502 cycles, 
Throughput: 28.1Mbps @1V, 110MHz
Op. Range 0.58V (9.6MHz) - 1.25V (169.6MHz)
Power 3.9mW @110MHz, 1V
ADCM
Area 100µm 145µm (1451 gates) 
Power 129µW @600MHz input, 110MHz output, 1V
Freq. (VCO) 600MHz
Op. Range 0.58V-1.25V @600MHz VCO clock
VCO
Freq. Range 93MHz - 600MHz
VCTRL 0 – 0.56V
6.3 Measured Results
6.3.1 Fault Injection and Analysis for Standalone AES
Fault Injection
To inject glitches in a controllable fashion, the testchip is supplied glitch enable signal
from Sakura-G based FPGA board. The FPGA chip runs at 48MHz with 67% duty cycle.
Glitch widths of 21ns/14ns are generated using full and high pulse period for the clock
[Fig. 6.4]. With the assumption that we only have approximate information about S-AES
rounds of operations, faults are injected towards the last few rounds only. The start signal
used to start AES encryption is also used by the FPGA chip to generate glitch enable
signal approximately in the proximity to the target rounds. In our experiments, to ensure
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Table 6.2: Summary of testchip with respect to S-AES, ADCM, VCO circuits.
Glitch 
Level

















0001 111 0 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 0
0011 160 1188 1173 112 11 157 282 275 29 5
0100 207 2727 2622 731 43 215 1518 1415 206 28
0111 274 2965 2752 1430 52 267 2594 2450 653 60
1000 321 2966 2786 1599 28 320 2798 2624 1067 53
1111 384 2972 2796 1721 0 374 2958 2752 1329 28
the inclusion of target operation(s) for fault injection, the faults are injected over a longer
duration (about 50% of total encryption duration - to approximately cover round 5 to round
10). When the encryption is started, a glitch counter circuit, after initial wait time is used to
generate glitch enable at incremented clock cycles [Fig. 6.5]. Glitch counter circuit is reset
after a programmable duration and whole process restarts. The wait, encryption (enc.) and
glitch counters are reconfigured to inject faults at different AES clock frequencies (FAES).
Since the AES clock and FPGA clock are asynchronous, the timing of fault injection with
respect to AES clock is random during each iteration of glitch counter. Also, since width
of the glitch enable signal is larger than the AES clock period, the supply glitch may affect
multiple bytes during AES operation.
Fault Model Selection
Since the faults are injected in a random fashion without accurate information/control on
timing of the faults, the faulty ciphertexts will consist of both exploitable and unexploitable
faults. To reduce the DFA time and computation complexity, we chose fault model pro-
posed by Piret and Quisquater [89] for AES which is based on single-byte fault injection
between MixColumn operation of round 7 and 8 and requires only 2 faulty ciphertexts to
find correct key.
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Fault Characterization and Analysis
Supply glitches are injected with different width (14ns and 21ns, controlled with glitch
enable generation circuit on FPGA chip) and different height (90mV to 384mV with sev-
eral intermediate levels, controlled with glitch lvl signal) at nominal operating conditions
(VAES=1V and FAES=110MHz). Fig. 6.7 and Fig. 6.8(a) show measured glitch height and
width for few cases. Under large glitch, the level shifter between VAES and VI/O cannot
support high speed, therefore, observed clock waveform is distorted. Table 6.2 summarizes
all the faults that are injected out of total 10,000 encryptions. Total number of faults in-
crease with increased glitch width/height. Most of the faults injected are all (16) byte faults
indicating a single-byte fault is induced before round 8 MixColumn or multi-byte faults are
injected. It is observed that at smaller drop in supply voltage, the unique 16-byte faults are
less compared to higher drop where most of the 16-byte faults injected are unique. For the
fault attack, all unique 16-byte faults are filtered out and 2 faulty ciphertexts are randomly
chosen for DFA until the key is recovered. The number of exploitable faults injected in-
crease initially with increasing drop in supply voltage as more unique faults are injected,
however as drop is increased further, exploitable faults decrease, mainly due to multi-byte


















Supply Glitch Injection with width=21ns
VNOM=1V VNOM=1V
(a) (b)
Figure 6.7: Glitch injection under nominal conditions (VAES=1V, FAES=110MHz) with
programmable glitch height and width: (a) glitch level=0011, width=21ns, (b) glitch
level=1111, width=21ns.
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ADCM Response to DC Supply Changes
(a)
(b)
Figure 6.8: (a) Glitch injection under nominal conditions (VAES=1V, FAES=110MHz) with
programmable glitch height and width: glitch level=0011, width=21ns and (b) Characteri-
zation of ADCM for DC supply voltage ranging from 0.72-1.25V.
were exploitable for a glitch width of 21ns. However, for same drop but 14ns glitch width,
28 exploitable faults were injected. The experiment indicates the importance of controlling
glitch height and width, even when we inject glitches randomly during the encryption.
6.3.2 Fault Mitigation with ADCM (Protected AES Mode)
Supply Glitch at VAES
In presence of supply drops, GM inside ADCM modulates CKG to prevent timing failures.
Since in our design, GM is in proximity to S-AES, it can modulate the clock even in pres-
ence of local supply noise, therefore, LM doesnt play a big role. Fig. 6.9 (a) & (b) show
operation of ADCM under highest glitch level (1111) at 1V and 0.72V. ADCM generates
rising clock edges only when entire critical path is traversed under supply glitch (the output
clock period is significantly increased at higher glitch levels). No faults could be injected
at nominal operating conditions even after 10 million encryptions under all glitch profiles
(width and level). However, when power supply is decreased to 0.8V and 0.72V, faults
could be injected (1 fault @0.8V and 168758 faults @0.72V, though only 1 unique fault
which is same at both supply conditions) even when ADCM is on. This could be caused by
slight mismatch between critical path replicas and actual critical path circuit at low supply





























Figure 6.9: ADCM responds to supply glitches: (a) at nominal conditions (VAES=1V,
FAES=110MHz) with the highest glitch level and (b) at VAES=0.72V with the highest glitch
level.
replicas as digital gates have very different behavior under extreme levels of supply noise
which is not observed with simulation/STA.
To mitigate these faults, timing margin is added with the help of programmable trimmer
inside GM (trimmer 0, configurable from 0-31 in increments of 1) with SEL TM=2. With
additional timing margin (SEL TM=2), no faults could be injected at 0.8V/0.72V. Fig.
6.8(b) shows ADCM output clock freq. characterized with DC changes in supply voltage
(0.72V-1.25V) for a few SEL TM settings. When the supply voltage is further reduced,
the level shifter [Fig. 6.1] between core (VAES) and I/O (3.3V) domains fails and internal
clock can no longer be observed. However, AES correctly operates up to 0.58V. We couldnt
inject any faults at 0.58V even with highest glitch level. When supply is further reduced,
ADCM and AES circuits completely fail and generate 16-byte unexploitable faults.
Temperature Variations
The delay of CMOS gates changes under temperature variations. To study the effect of
temperature on injected faults and ADCM generated output clock frequency, testchip was
subjected to hot air flow for 30 seconds with a 120V/300W heat gun from about 3cm.
Fig. 6.10(a) shows the response of ADCM at room temperature and high temperature.










Fault Injection with Temperature 
Variations @VAES=1V, FAES=110MHz
ADCM Response to Temperature Variations
(a) (b)












Figure 6.10: (a) effect of increased temperature on ADCM output clock freq., and (b) more
faults are injected at high temperature at nominal conditions (VAES=1V, FAES=110MHz)
however with ADCM turned ON, all faults are prevented.
FIA becomes critical at higher voltages under overheating. At nominal operating condi-
tions (FAES=110MHz, VAES=1V), only one fault could be injected at room temperature
after 100K encryptions while number of faults increase to 3376 at high temperature [Fig.
6.10(b)]. A skilled adversary can control the testchip temperature to induce temperature
dependent faults during the last few rounds for FIA. With ADCM turned on, no faults are
injected with 100K encryptions at room temperature or high temperature.
Supply Glitch at VVCO
Since an adversary doesnt have access to internal clock when ADCM is ON, he/she may
still alter VCO supply clock to modify the operation of ADCM itself. We shorted VCO
supply (VVCO) with VAES to investigate the effect of supply glitch on VCO and there fore
ADCM. Under nominal conditions, we couldnt inject any faults however at VVCO=0.9V
[Fig. 6.11(a)], we were able to inject same fault as observed for VAES=0.72V in previous
section. This fault goes away for SEL TM=2. When VVCO is further reduced, both VCO
and ADCM operate reliably at reduced DC supply however under supply glitch, it is no
longer operational [Fig. 6.11(b)].
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VNOM=0.67V
















ADCM response to Supply (VVCO, VAES shorted) Glitch
(a) (b)
Figure 6.11: (a) effect of glitch on VCO supply voltage when VAES and VVCO are shorted,
ADCM still operates reliably under glitches and (b) Impact of reducing VAES, VVCO
(shorted) to very low levels.
6.3.3 Discussion
Traditionally error-resilient circuits have been designed to tolerate and correct for timing
errors under small supply glitch to increase performance. Exploiting these timing error de-
tection/correction and prevention (ADCM) circuits to mitigate fault attack is an interesting
research direction as an adversary will try all possible methods to make the circuit fail even
with abnormal operating conditions, e.g. high supply glitches. Additionally, the error-
resilient circuits may themselves fail giving rise to a possible path to inject faults in the
cryptographic hardware. We observed the need to build timing margin to account for any
layout mismatches or in case some other path is activated under certain conditions. Design
flow in [139] can be used to minimize these mismatches. Additionally, parasitics of on-
chip power delivery network will create small mismatches in the exact timing of injected
glitch at ADCM and AES. A proficient adversary may be able to exploit these differences
to inject faults. However, for a large design, it is recommended to have distributed local
modulator circuits to respond to local supply noise. Additionally, ADCM cannot prevent
timing errors due to hold failures [95]. With large +ve spikes in supply voltage, short paths
in S-AES (primarily related to control/finite state machines) can be activated. However, a
guardband can be built into the design to tackle hold issues at small area and power over-
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heads without any impact on performance. Moreover, since proposed ADCM generated
output clock period is a multiple of source clock period, input data-dependent fluctuations
in critical path delay (may lead to an unintentional timing side channel) are only minimally
reflected in the generated clock.
Compared to other error-resilient architectures, ADCM prevents timing errors from oc-
curring while other techniques, such as Razor [72], may completely stall the pipeline result-
ing in denial-of-service attacks. Additionally, unlike Razor which requires modifying the
sequential elements, ADCM doesnt require any modification in the underlying hardware
and therefore has very small overheads (12.5% area and 3.3% power Table 1). Finally,
ADCM doesnt require any complex glitch detection circuits like in [43].
6.4 Summary
This chapter demonstrated that a ADCM circuit, normally designed to increase variation
tolerance, can also prevent supply glitch and temperature variations-based fault injection
attacks. Measurement results from a 130nm CMOS test-chip showed successful DFA at-
tack on a standalone S-AES digital core with externally controlled fault injections and pro-
grammable glitch width and height. However, when ADCM is turned on to provide clock
to S-AES, no fault could be injected even after 10 million encryptions under wide range
of operating conditions. ADCM can mitigate both supply glitch and temperature varia-
tion induced faults and incurs only 12.5% area and 3.3% power overheads and improves
performance under supply transient noise.
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CHAPTER 7
LIGHTWEIGHT SCA COUNTERMEASURES UTILIZING INTEGRATED
DIGITAL LDO
The recent trends in utilizing on-chip integrated voltage regulators (VRs) to provide SCA
protection show that they can help in two ways - 1) by isolating the measurement node of
the IC from the local supply node of the encryption engine and 2) by inducing frequency
dependent transformations that help in suppressing the information leakage. Authors in
[46, 47, 50, 129, 140, 141] presented several countermeasures based on switching DC-
DC regulators (both inductive and switched capacitor) against P-SCA attacks. Authors
in [100, 135] demonstrated that integrated inductive voltage regulator (IVR) can also be
used to protect against EM-SCA attacks due to constant switching of IVR power-stage
and inductor current in the proximity of the encryption engine. In Chapter 5, we saw that
IVR when integrated with ADCM circuit can also be used to randomize EM signatures
generated from AES and therefore provide SCA resistance. However, due to requirement
of large passives (L, C) and high complexity of these regulators, usually the same regulator
is shared across the entire processor and encryption hardware, therefore any randomization
scheme employed to further enhance the SCA resistance [46] affects the performance of
the entire system [Fig. 7.1]. Authors in [81, 83, 84] have demonstrated P-SCA resistance
offered by both digital and analog LDO regulators with simulation studies. Digital LDOs
do not require any inductor, are simpler to design and are scalable across process nodes
and therefore are very suitable for ultra fine-grained power management and point of load
regulation [40, 41].
This chapter presents the 130nm CMOS testchip designed to experimentally demon-
strate improved power and EM SCA resistance of standard (unprotected) 128-bit AES and




















































Figure 7.1: Utilizing integrated voltage regulators as SCA countermeasures, (a) limitations
of switching DC-DC converter based SCA protection schemes and (b) proposed on-die
digital LDO integrated with ADCM circuit for simultaneous supply and clock modulation
to improve SCA resistance.
testchip consists of proposed 250MHz DLDO with 2.3nF output capacitor powering two
128b AES cores (parallel AES: P-AES and serial AES: S-AES) [142] and a 128b SIMON
core along with 2 randomization circuits (SNI and R-VREF) [Fig. 7.2].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 presents system architecture
and perform model analysis for the proposed DLDO; Section 7.2 presents SNI & R-VREF
circuit techniques that are proposed to further enhance SCA resistance; Section 7.3 presents
simulation studies for the impact of digital LDO on SCA leakage from encryption engines;
Section 7.4 discusses measurement setup and postprocessing methods; Section 7.5 present
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Figure 7.2: System architecture consisting of nominal DLDO, AES and SIMON cores,
proposed SNI, R-VREF R-VREF & ADCM circuits.
7.1 System Architecture
7.1.1 Design of Encryption Engines
Two different encryption algorithms (128-bit AES and 128-bit SIMON) are implemented
on the testchip. For AES algorithm, two cores, one with 128-bit parallel (P-AES) datapath
and other with 8-bit serial (S-AES) datapath while for SIMON algorithm, a bit-serial (1b)
datapath has been implemented. The architecture for these datapaths has been presented in
Chapter 3.
7.1.2 Design of Digital LDO
A fully-synthesizable digital LDO is integrated on-chip to provide currents and regulate
supply voltage to the encryption cores. The proposed digital LDO consists of a power-stage
with 32-bit equally sized PMOS elements, a programmable resistor-divider for scaling the
output voltage, a 4-bit delay-line based analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and a digital






















Figure 7.3: Digital implementation of proportional-integral-derivative (PID) compensator
in parallel form.
output of DPID controller into 32-bit thermometer code to control PMOS devices in the
power-stage. An output capacitor of 1.9nF is integrated on-chip using metal-insulator-
metal (MIM) technology. DPID controller, a type-III compensator with 2 zeros and 2
poles, is implemented in its parallel form [Fig. 7.3]. It takes 5-bit error as an input and
generates 5-bit compensated output based on 5-bit proportional (KP ), 5-bit integral (KI)
and 4-bit derivative (KD) gains. Both ADC and DPID controller datapaths are optimized
to run at 250MHz on-chip voltage-controlled-oscillator (VCO) generated clock.
7.1.3 Transformations via Digital LDO
Measured supply current at the input supply (VIN,DLDO) of the chip is a transformed version
of the internal on-die supply current of the encryption engine measured at local supply
node (VENC). This section presents theoretical analysis for transformations that encryption
current undergoes through digital LDO before it is measured at the input supply node.
For small-signal modeling, all the blocks including sample and hold, delay-line ADC,
PID compensator, zero-order-hold (ZOH), power-stage and the output load are modeled as
below:






where vLSB is the analog voltage change for 1 LSB (least-significant-bit) difference in the
digitized ADC output.









where kp, ki and kd are proportional, integral and derivative gains respectively. The PID
compensator transfer function has three poles, two of those at z = 0 (one pole due to
1-cycle delay) and another pole at z = 1, two zeros whose locations are determined by
the compenstor gains {kp, ki, kd}. Fig. 7.3 describes the digital implementation of com-
pensator with fixed/reduced precision arithmetic. Since the output of PID compensator is
registered, a single cycle delay (z-1) is incorporated in z-domain transfer function. Effective
gains for the PID compensator can be represented as below:
kp =
KP [4 : 0]
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, ki =
















is the load pole and Ts = 1Fs is the sampling period. For steady-state
stability/ripple analysis, the PMOS array is modeled as an effective resistance RP but for
transient simulation, PMOS devices are modeled using PMOS current equations (large-
signal) in triode and saturation regions. In steady-state, PMOS is always assumed to be in
triode region with a constant PMOS device resistance. Effective resistance of power-stage
is determined by dropout voltage (VDO) and load current (IL, RP = VDOIL in steady state).
Open-loop/closed-loop transfer function for the DLDO system can be derived with z-
107
domain transfer functions for the individual blocks:
HOL(z) = z
−2.
KOL(z − zPI)(z − zPD)
(z − 1)(z − e−wLTs)
(7.5)
where KOL is the DC gain for the open-loop DLDO system and zPI , zPD are two zeros





The DLDO power stage acts as a low-pass filter with bandwidth dictated by the equiv-
alent resistance of the power stage and output capacitor, thereby attenuating the high freq.
current signatures. The DLDO control loop induces freq.-dependent small signal and large
signal perturbations dictated by the loop delay and zero/pole locations. Any current fluc-
tuations in the encryption engine has two paths to propagate to the input of the DLDO 1)
a direct path through the power-stage to the DLDO input or 2) through the feedback path
including the ADC, digital PID compensator and the power-stage to the input of DLDO.
Both of these paths introduce freq. dependent large and small signal transformations in
the encryption/load current. The small signal perturbation at the encryption current/load















































Figure 7.4: DLDO model analysis and transformations. (a) Bode plot for the open loop
DLDO under nominal operating conditions and at 31mA base current, (b) small signal
attenuation and (c) large signal amplitude distortions.
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the input current. Current transformation from encryption current to input current can be
modeled using a transfer function for the DLDO as discussed above in Eq. 7.5. The load
pole , poles and zeros added with PID compensator and ADC as well as open-loop DC
gain of the system determine the small signal transformations and the bandwidth of the
DLDO system. Due to limited bandwidth of the closed-loop DLDO system (open loop
bode plot in Fig. 7.4(a) shows a bandwidth of 10.3MHz), high freq. components of en-
cryption current are significantly attenuated. In addition to small-signal transformations,
under large and sudden variations in load current, nonlinear characteristics of the PMOS
devices and the control loop must be taken into considerations to determine the large sig-
nal transformations. Large signal transformations lead to information loss which can be
attributed to limited sampling of the output voltage, quantization losses through the ADC,
controller and power-stage. Fig. 7.4(b) and (c) show attenuation of high-freq. signatures
due to small-signal and signal distortions due to large-signal characteristics of the DLDO
closed loop.
7.2 Proposed Circuit Techniques
Two circuit techniques proposed to improve the SCA resistance in addition to what is of-
fered by the nominal DLDO are described below:
7.2.1 Switching Noise Injection (SNI)
One major leakage path for DLDO is through the enabled PMOS devices which are always
”ON” and connect output VENC directly to the input VIN,DLDO. Even though this path acts as
a low pass filter (LPF) with cutoff freq. dependent on the effective resistance (RP‖RL) and
effective capacitance (CL) at the output node, low-freq. signals in the encryption current
directly propagate to VIN,DLDO. To prevent leakage via this path, we propose SNI circuit
which disconnects VENC from VIN,DLDO for a very small fraction of the DLDO clock cycle
[Fig. 7.5(a)]. SNI circuit consists of 9 pulse generators. Each pulse generator receives 9
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positive (p) and 9 negative (n) phases from the 9-phase differential delay cell based VCO
and generates a pulse (pulse out) with programmable width every DLDO clock cycle. All
the 9 pulses (pulse0, pulse1, ..., pulse8) are spread across the DLDO clock cycle and the
output of a free-running linear feedback shift register (LFSR, LFSR1) selects one of these 9
pulses every DLDO clock cycle, thus ensuring pseudo-random location of generated pulse
out signal. The width of these pulses can be programmed to be one of 3 possible widths
based on user specified settings or using an on-chip LFSR (LFSR2) [Fig. 7.5(b)]. When
SNI is enabled, during the high level of the SNI pulse, DLDO is disconnected, the output
voltage drops significantly with total drop determined by the pulse width as well as the
size of load capacitor (CL). When SNI pulse is de-asserted, DLDO becomes operational,
however, due to large drop in the output voltage, feedback loop tries to compensate for the
large error which results in the overshoot [Fig. 7.5(c)]. Since an SNI pulse is generated
every DLDO clock cycle, it results in consistent spikes in the supply voltage. Addition-
ally, due to pseudo-random nature of the SNI pulse, the spikes are also pseudo-random,
therefore achieving randomization in the power supply for the encryption cores. However,
due to large spikes in the supply, to ensure correct operation, we propose integrating clock
modulators to tolerate additional supply noise.
7.2.2 All-digital Clock Modulation (ADCM) Circuit
ADCM circuit [100] responds to any DC shift/transient noise in supply voltage at cycle-
by-cycle speed. ADCM utilizes critical path replica (CPR) based global modulator (GM)
and local modulator (LM) to achieve this. GM responds to DC shift and global noise while
LM ensures correct operation under local supply noise. GM runs at very high VCO clock
freq. (≈ 600MHz) and generates a clock with clock period multiples of VCO clock period
tracking the critical path delay. LM takes output of GM as input and stretches the clock
edges in duty modulation or skips clock edges in clock gating mode to ensure correct clock














































































D C D C D CD C D C D








Figure 7.5: Block diagram for (a) proposed SNI circuit, (b) circuit operation, and (c) supply
and clock randomization achieved with SNI and ADCM.
of all 3 encryption cores. With ADCM enabled, temporal noise is added due to pseudo-
random nature of shifts added in the clock edges. The amount of temporal noise depends
on the average voltage noise added during each encryption clock cycle [Fig. 7.5(c)] and
helps in SCA protection.
7.2.3 Random VREF Generator (R-VREF)
We propose to further scramble the power/EM signatures using simultaneous supply and
clock modulation using DLDO and ADCM circuit. Random VREF generator (R-VREF)














Circuit Operation: 1 LFSR Cycle




























Figure 7.6: Block diagram for (a) proposed R-VREF circuit and (b) circuit operation.
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VREF words (each 4-bit) are loaded on 16 on-chip 4-bit registers. A 4-bit full-length LFSR
(LFSR3) can select any of these words based on its output. LFSR clock which controls the
speed of VREF update is derived from the DLDO clock using a divider with division setting
configurable to divide-by-1, 4, 16 or 64. Fig. 7.6(b) shows the circuit operation for the R-
VREF. As reference word is updated with R-VREF generator, DLDO system responds and
VENC tries to track these changes. VENC is also fed to the ADCM which generates correct
clock edges under DC changes in supply as well as during transitions. Due to limited
dynamic range of DLDO, only 4 different values for VREF could be programmed.
7.3 Simulation Study for Impact of Digital LDO on Side Channel Leakage from
Encryption Engines
In this section, we model the digital LDO as discussed in Section 4.1.2 and Section 4.1.3
and analyze the impact of digital LDO on side channel leakage from P-AES with respect
to correlation power analysis (CPA) and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). We vary various pa-
rameters, such as ADC resolution (QADC) and sampling frequency (Fs), PID compensator






































Figure 7.7: Simulation framework for integrated digital LDO and encryption core.
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7.3.1 Simulation Framework
Fig. 7.7 shows the integrated framework combining encryption engines and digital LDO.
The input verilog for the encryption core is synthesized using Synopsys DesignCompiler
(DC) tool to generate gate level netlist using GlobalFoundary’s 130nm standard (std) cell
library. The gate level netlist is functionally simulated using an input testbench to generate
switching activity values for all the internal nodes during an encryption. Power simulations
are performed on the gate level netlist with parasitics (SDF) and switching activity file as
inputs using Synopsys PrimeTime PX to obtain power/current consumption profile as a
function of time. This current consumption profile (encryption current, IENC) is used as
a load current for the the digital LDO to generate the input current profile at the input of
DLDO (IIN). The encryption current profile is sampled at the rate of 1ps per sample (same
























Figure 7.8: (a) Simulated current waveform for one P-AES encryption and (b) spectral







































Digital LDO Simulations under Nominal Settings
FENC 2FENC
Figure 7.9: (a) Current profile at the input of DLDO (IIN) in response to changes in the
encryption current for one P-AES encryption, (b) spectral content shows major (but at-
tenuated with respect to P-AES without DLDO) peak corresponding to encryption clock
frequency (FENC), its harmonics and a small peak at the DLDO clock frequency (FDLDO)
and (c) output waveform (VOUT) for the digital LDO under load changes due to encryption
operation.
Fig. 7.8(a) shows the encryption current profile for 1 P-AES encryption running at
62.5MHz (FENC) encryption clock frequency. Large spikes are observed for each round of
P-AES which is computed in one clock cycles. Additionally, slightly smaller spikes are also
observed at both positive and negative clock edges. FFT of the encryption current shows
































Figure 7.10: CPA attack results on the standalone P-AES core at local supply node (VENC)
for subkey/byte 9: (a) correlation plot with 1000 simulations/traces and (b) MTD plot
shows correct subkey 9 can be recovered with only 150 simulations/traces.
current profile at the input of DLDO is shown in Fig. 7.9 along with its FFT and profile
for the output voltage (VOUT). The high frequency signals in the encryption current are
found to be significantly attenuated due to limited bandwidth of the DLDO under nominal
operation conditions (10.3MHz, Table 7.2). The low-frequency spectrum is dominated by
DLDO transient response characteristics. In addition to amplitude attenuation, significant
amplitude distortions are observed in the input current (IIN) due to frequency dependent
delays added through the DLDO. A smaller peak corresponding to DLDO clock frequency
(FDLDO or Fs) is also observed in the FFT of IIN.
7.3.2 SCA for Standalone P-AES
Both CPA and SNR analysis, as described in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2), are per-
formed on the simulated encryption current for the P-AES encryption core in the time
domain. A moving average with 1000 points (equivalent to 1ns) based filter is used to
post-process and average out the noise (timing and amplitude). All the 16 subkeys for 128-
bit P-AES key are correctly revealed with CPA attack and subkey 9 (out of subkeys 0 to
15) is found to be the highest leaking (minimum MTD) subkey. Fig. 7.10(a) shows the
correlation coefficient plotted against time for 1000 simulations. The number of simula-
tions/traces required to reveal the subkey 9 correctly is only 150 [Fig. 7.10(b)]. SNR for
































Figure 7.11: CPA attack results on the DLDO powered P-AES core at the input of DLDO
(VIN,DLDO) for subkey/byte 9: (a) correlation plot with 30000 simulations/traces and (b)
MTD plot shows correct subkey 9 can be recovered with 9000 simulations/traces, indicating
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Figure 7.12: Effect of PID compensator gains on the DLDO transient response to the en-
cryption current.
P-AES (without DLDO) is 0.178.
7.3.3 Impact of Digital LDO
For the DLDO powered P-AES core, the simulated current at the input of DLDO (IIN)
has attenuated and distorted signals leading to reduced SNR and increased difficulty in
CPA attack. Correlation plot in Fig. 7.11(a) shows that subkey 9 for the P-AES core with
DLDO can still be correctly recovered with 30000 simulations however MTD plot in Fig.
7.11(b) shows that 9000 simulations are required at the minimum indicating an increase of
60× with respect to just the P-AES core (without the DLDO). SNR analysis in Table 7.2
shows a degradation of 6.88× (0.1788 to 0.026) under nominal operating conditions and
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Table 7.1: Configurations of Digital LDO analyzed with respect to their impact on SCA
leakage for P-AES.
Standalone




PID Gains - kP=2232 , kI=
24
32
, kD= 932 ;
VIN=1V; VOUT=0.84V; CL=2.3nF; IBase=31mA
Range of Controller Parameters:
Fs: 10MHz, 100MHz, 250MHz, 500MHz, 1GHz, 2GHz, 5GHz
QADC: 6.25mV, 12.5mV, 25mV, 50mV, 100mV






Impact of Controller Parameter(s)
Next we analyze the impact of various controller parameters on the CPA attack results with
respect to MTD and SNR values. CPA was performed with upto 32000 simulations while
SNR was computed with 1000 simulations for all configurations as shown in Table 7.2.
ADC resolution (QADC) not only adds more quantization losses through ADC, it modifies
Table 7.2: Comparison of DLDO bandwidth and stability margins with SCA leakage for










Standalone P-AES - - - 150 0.179
Nominal DLDO
QADC=25mV, Fs=250MHz,
kP, kI, kD=(22, 24, 9)/32
10.3 48 9000 0.026
ADC Resolution 
(QADC, mV)
6.25 37.3 -39 (Unstable) 28000 0.0207
12.5 17 19.2 >32000 0.016
50 5.4 67 5000 0.119
100 2.7 78.5 5000 0.119
Sampling Freq. for 
both ADC & 
controller (Fs, MHz) 
10 0.46 63.5 20000 0.034
100 4.5 58.8 9000 0.026
500 17.7 37.2 9000 0.026
1000 27.8 27.4 >32000 0.015
2000 41.7 19.8 >32000 0.023
5000 68.1 12.6 >32000 0.0335
PID Gains (kP, kI, kD)
(10, 7, 2)/32 3.2 78.8 9000 0.026
(0, 1, 0)/32 0.46 87.4 9000 0.026
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the open-loop DC gain of the feedback loop. A higher gain means higher bandwidth, how-
ever, a very high gain may lead to reduced phase margin and in some cases unstable loop.
On the other side, a very poor ADC resolution (higher QADC and smaller DC gain) leads
to smaller DLDO bandwidth, and in some cases, DLDO loop may not even respond to
small changes in the encryption current as ADC output doesn’t change unless change in
VOUT is more than 1 ADC bin. For very poor ADC resolution, feedback loop is always
non-responsive with direct path through power-stage with a R-C low pass filtering deter-
mining the output voltage. For these cases, IIN is low-pass filtered version of IENC with high
frequency signature attenuation (no signal distortion that is attributed to DLDO feedback
loop). An interesting trend is observed when sampling frequency (Fs) of the feedback loop
is varied. For very low Fs, the DLDO loop responds very slowly, with R-C filter dominating
the immediate response (therefore only attenuation is observed with small or no signal dis-
tortion) leading to higher SNR compared to nominal case. However, as Fs is increased, the
DLDO feedback loop with higher bandwidth starts responding adding quantization losses
and signal distortion. For very high Fs, the DLDO feedback loop can respond very fast
and very accurately and therefore increasing the SNR in IIN. Compensator PID gains have
negligible impact on SNR. Fig. 7.12 shows that even with varying gains, the response
of DLDO during the targeted round of the encryption is similar therefore producing same
SNR results. Very similar trends are observed for CPA MTD.
7.4 Experimental Setup and SCA Methodology
Fig. 7.13(a) & (b) show 1mm×2mm testchip [67] fabricated in 130nm CMOS consisting
of digital LDO with proposed SNI and R-VREF circuits, AES and SIMON cores and key
design details [143]. Fig. 7.13(c) shows the measurement framework. The nominal oper-
ating conditions for encryption cores in standalone mode (without DLDO) are ∼ 62MHz
@0.84V. When ADCM is enabled, these cores can run at ∼ 80MHz at 0.84V. Test-board






































































VIN [V] 0.5 – 1.22
VOUT [V] 0.35 – 1.17
Current [mA] 5 – 145
Load Cap [nF] 1.9 (0.44mm2)
Compensator Type III































































Figure 7.13: (a) Die photo, (b) details of the testchip and (c) measurement setup.
tures are captured at both VIN,DLDO and VENC across a 1Ω resistor while EM emanations
are acquired with EMC probe (Beehive EMC probe 100A, loop diameter: 0.4”, 3dB band-
width: 1GHz) [98] near VENC and VIN,DLDO [Fig. 7.14(b)]. The external trigger used to
start encryption is also used to trigger Tektronix DPO5204 oscilloscope (2GHz bandwidth,















EM probe is placed to ensure capture of EM 























































Figure 7.14: (a) Test-board manufactured to measure side channel activity, (b) pinout spec-
ifications for the testchip showing the power, ground pins critical for EM signature acqui-




Encryption cores are powered from external supply (0.84V) and run at fixed clock freq. (∼
62MHz). Both DLDO and ADCM are turned off. Power/EM signatures are measured at
VENC.
DLDO-ENC System
Encryption cores are powered from the output of digital LDO at a fixed supply (0.84V)
and fixed clock (∼ 62MHz). ADCM is turned off. Power/EM signatures are captured at
VIN,DLDO.
DLDO-ENC System with SNI & R-VREF (DLDO-ENC-SR System)
Both SNI & R-VREF are enabled for DLDO-ENC system. Signatures are captured at
VIN,DLDO. Intermediate design points with only SNI (DLDO-ENC-S) and only R-VREF
(DLDO-ENC-R) are also analyzed.
SNI when enabled creates voltage noise ranging from 0.75V to 0.98V with several large
spikes [Fig. 7.15(a)]. However, average voltage noise added over AES clock period is
small and therefore, ADCM generates only slightly lower (vs nominal) freq. levels ranging
from 64MHz to 79MHz with mean freq. of 72.5MHz. Similarly, with R-VREF turned
on, the voltage varies from 0.79V to 0.88V (90mV total) and corresponding clock varies
from 66MHz to 86MHz (mean freq. of 79.1MHz) [Fig. 7.15(b)]. Fig. 7.16 shows the
load transient response for the nominal DLDO for a 40mA load step (5mA to 45mA in
























Figure 7.15: Measured circuit operation for (a) SNI and (b) R-VREF with respect to supply
voltage (VENC) and clock (CKENC) inputs to encryption cores. SNI is enabled with highest





















Settling time: 100ns (within 
2.5% of final VOUT)
ILOAD
DLDO Load Transient Response
DLDO peak current efficiency 
= 97.8% @ILOAD=145mA, 
VIN=1.22V, VOUT=1.02V
Figure 7.16: Measured load transient response for the nominal DLDO with ∆
IL=40mA/100ps @VIN=1.0V, VOUT=0.84V.
7.4.2 SCA Methodology
Two tests are employed to quantify the effectiveness of proposed countermeasures- 1)
TVLA and 2) CPA (CEMA). Both of these tests have been presented in Chapter 3 but
are briefly described below:
TVLA
TVLA is a standard statisitcal hpyothesis testing methodology to validate SCA resistance
offered by a countermeasure [76]. In our experiments, with TVLA, a t-statistic based on
Weltch’s t-test is computed in both time and freq. domain using 100000 measurements. A
t-statistc of more than±4.5 indicates leakage with 99.9999% confidence. Compared to our
prior work in [100], only 1st order TVLA is used.
121
CPA & CEMA
As described in Chapter 3.2.2, both correlation power analysis (CPA) and correlation EM
analysis (CEMA) is performed on the measured power and EM signatures. Upto 10 million
measurements are collected to evaluate the success of the proposed countermeasures. Both
CPA/CEMA are also analyzed in frequency domain as well.
7.4.3 Postprocessing of Measured Traces
Fig. 7.17 shows the postprocessing methods used to filter and align the measured signa-
tures. TVLA and CPA tests are subsequently carried out on the filtered and aligned signa-









20-100MHz and 5MHz to 













Noisy traces with 
misalignment 20ns
Figure 7.17: Postprocessing including filtering and alignment of captured signatures and






































Figure 7.18: Baseline (standalone P-AES) system: (a) measured waveforms captured
at/near VENC and (b) their spectral characteristics. Both DLDO and ADCM circuits are
turned off.
122
at VENC , all 11-rounds of operation are clearly observed. A spectral peak is observed at
the clock freq. (62MHz) in the FFT of these signatures [Fig. 7.18(b)]. Other spectral peaks
are considerably smaller. Power/EM signatures have similar spectral content (strength, fre-
quencies). Fig. 7.19(a) shows the measured signatures for DLDO-ENC and DLDO-ENC-
SR systems. For DLDO-ENC system, the measured power/EM signatures show clear peaks
but significant signal distortion/attenuation is observed, also demonstrated by the spectrum
[Fig. 7.20(a)]. For DLDO-ENC-SR system, the peaks are no longer observable in power






















Measured Waveforms for P-AES for DLDO-ENC System Measured Waveforms for P-AES for DLDO-ENC-SR System


































































Figure 7.20: Spectral characteristics of measured signatures for P-AES for (a) DLDO-ENC
and (b) DLDO-ENC-S systems.
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teristics with observable peaks during the encryption (attributed to EM emanations from
on-chip power grid as well as the ground node of the chip), however, its strength is much
weaker than power signature. Spectra of these signatures show freq. spreading for both
SNI and R-VREF [Fig. 7.20(b) & 7.21(a)]. SNI adds several peaks in high freq. bands
commensurate to DLDO clock freq. while R-VREF causes freq. spreading near encryption
clock freq. (FENC), therefore, suppressing signals in both low and high freq. regions leading














































































Figure 7.21: Spectral characteristics of measured power/EM signatures for P-AES for






















































Figure 7.23: TVLA analysis for P-AES for (a) DLDO-ENC and (b) DLDO-ENC-SR sys-
tems.
7.5 Measured SCA Results: Power and EM SCA
7.5.1 Power Side Channel Analysis (P-SCA) on P-AES
TVLA Analysis
For TVLA analysis, the worst case TVLA peak across time and freq. [max(|t-statistic(time)|,
|t-statistic(freq)|) is considered for comparison.
Baseline System
T-statistic for the baseline system at VIN,DLDO node plotted against time in Fig. 7.22 shows
high levels of leakage for unprotected P-AES system (peak of 256.3) in 5MHz-15MHz
band. Freq. domain TVLA shows slightly higher TVLA peak (258) [Table 7.3]. High
levels of leakage are also observed across all filter bands with higher leakages observed at
low freq. bands indicating low freq. components tend to carry more information than high
freq. components [Fig. 7.24].
DLDO-ENC System
For the DLDO-ENC system, TVLA analysis performed at VIN,DLDO shows that t-statistic in
time domain is significantly reduced [Fig. 7.23(a)] to 21.7. Leakage reduces in most of the
filter bands but most of the reduction occurs at low freq. bands [Fig. 7.24]. Reduction in
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TVLA peak can be attributed to inherent freq. dependent transformations induced by the
DLDO in the encryption currents. Also as highlighted in Fig. 7.19(a), signal distortions
due to close loop operation of the DLDO help in reducing the information leakage. Since
the bandwidth and phase margin of the DLDO is dependent on PID gains, changing these
gains modulates the TVLA leakage [Table 7.3]. For larger PID gains, the feedback path
through the controller plays a big role as it responds to transient load currents and controller
losses due to sampling freq., ADC and power-stage quantization affect the TVLA leakage.
In contrast, DLDO with smaller bandwidth cannot respond to high freq. signatures making
the direct leakage path from VOUT to VIN,DLDO through power-stage prominent. Note that we
saw no/negligible impact of PID gains on SNR or CPA MTD from simulations. The reason
behind contrasting results between simulations and measurements is difference in SCA
metric. Unlike SNR/CPA, TVLA measures the SCA leakages during intermediate rounds
of computations (round 3-7 for P-AES). In Fig. 7.12 we saw that IIN during intermediate
rounds of P-AES are modified through DLDO when we vary PID gains while last round
has negligible/no changes.
DLDO-ENC-SR System
For the DLDO-ENC-SR system, the TVLA leakage in time domain further reduces to
10.3 (leakage in freq. domain=9.95) indicating a total reduction of 25.1× [Fig. 7.23(b)].
Leakage in most of the filter bands reduces below the threshold of 4.5 [Fig. 7.24].
Table 7.3 illustrates the impact of SNI & R-VREF circuits separately and explores
impact of different settings (pulse width for SNI and LFSR clock freq. for R-VREF). For
SNI, reduced TVLA leakages are observed when SNI pulse width is increased. Similarly,
for R-VREF, an intermediate clock freq. for LFSR relative to encryption clock freq. as
well as DLDO bandwidth is ideal to achieve good randomization of the supply voltage and
clock freq. Table 7.3 shows that DIV16 setting for the LFSR clock has smaller TVLA











































Figure 7.24: TVLA peak vs filter bands show reduced leakage across all bands for DLDO-
ENC system which further reduces for DLDO-ENC-SR system.




TVLA Leakage Max 
TVLATime Freq.
Baseline P-AES - 256.3 258 258
PID 
Controller
22/32, 24/32, 9/32* 21.7 23.4 23.4
10/32, 7/32, 2/32 25.2 24.3 25.2
0, 1/32, 0 31.7 32.9 32.9
LFSR clock 
for R-VREF
DIV16* 9.9 13.1 13.1
DIV64 17 17.4 17.4
Pulse width 
for SNI
Tclock/9 14 15.3 15.3
2Tclock/9 13.7 11.7 13.7















*configuration selected in this work for SCA analysis unless stated specifically
CPA Analysis
Baseline System
Fig. 7.25(a) & (b) show time/freq. domain CPA for byte 9 of the key (highest leaking byte)
for baseline P-AES system with 10K traces. Correct subkey is revealed in both time/freq.
domains. Peak correlation plotted against # of measurements for freq. domain CPA in
Fig. 7.26(a) shows an MTD of only 400 measurements. MTD for time domain CPA is
800 measurements. Since freq. domain CPA always provides better results, the subsequent



























Figure 7.25: CPA attack results for P-AES for Byte 9 for baseline system in (a) time do-
main, (b) freq. domain with 10K traces.
in this chapter. CR for byte 9 is plotted against filter bands in Fig. 7.29 for 5 million
measurements. It shows that correct subkey can be recovered from all filter bands indicating
information leakage across the entire frequency spectrum. SR plotted in Fig. 7.28(c) shows
that 80% of all subkeys can be recovered with only 1900 measurements.
Effect of Power Gate and Decoupling Capacitance
When P-AES is powered externally through VOUT (DLDO, R-VREF, SNI are off) to emu-
late a design with an on power gate (test-control switch) with 1.9nF decoupling capacitor
on the ungated input rail and 0.4nF on the virtual rail [Fig. 7.27(a)], the MTD increases to
only 2200 from 400 for byte 9. Similarly, MTD for 80% SR for CPA and CEMA increases
to 4800 from 1900 for P-AES [Fig. 7.27(b)]. Therefore, when on-chip decoupling capac-
itor is increased from 0.4nF to 1.9nF+0.4nF (2.3nF total), the total decoupling capacitor
along with test-control switch with its finite resistance acts as a low pass filter. Some of the
high frequency components are filtered out but since most of the leakage is concentrated in



































Figure 7.26: Freq. domain CPA attack results for Byte 9 for P-AES for (a) baseline system










































Figure 7.27: Effect of test-control power gate and on-chip decoupling capacitance on
CPA/CEMA results (a) measurement configuration and (b) MTD for 80% SR for the base-
line P-AES shows small impact of on-chip decap (0.4nF vs 2.3nF).
DLDO-ENC System
CPA performed for DLDO-ENC system shows that byte 9 can be recovered with 120K
measurements (an increase of 300× with respect to baseline) []Fig. 7.26(b)]. Like baseline
system, CR plot in Fig. 7.29 shows that most of the filter bands can be used to reveal the
































Figure 7.28: Freq. domain CPA attack results for P-AES for Byte 9 for (a) DLDO-ENC-SR


































Figure 7.29: CR plotted against filter band shows large leakage in all bands for baseline
system which reduces for DLDO-ENC and DLDO-ENC-SR systems.
DLDO-ENC-SR System
For the DLDO-ENC-SR system, byte 9 can still be revealed, however, the number of mea-
surements required increase to 3.6 millions (9000× with respect to baseline) [Fig. 7.28(a)].
MTD for 80% SR increases to 8 million (4210× over baseline) [Fig. 7.28(b)].
With only SNI or only R-VREF enabled for DLDO-ENC system, CPA MTD for 80%
SR is 2.4 millions or 3.6 millions respectively [Fig. 7.28(b)]. SNI adds significant high
freq. noise (determined by FDLDO and its transient response) while signal scrambling near
FENC is small as average noise added during each encryption clock cycle doesn’t cause












































Figure 7.30: TVLA leakage vs filter bands for EM-SCA shows reduced leakage for DLDO-
ENC-SR system, however, leakage is higher than P-SCA.
supply voltage is modulated at lower speed (250MHz/16 ≈ 16MHZ), ADCM generates
FENC with larger variations. SNI & R-VREF together help in suppressing leakage across
entire freq. spectrum [Fig. 7.29]. Additionally, even though TVLA analysis shows SNI is
more effective vs R-VREF [Table 7.3], CPA analysis shows opposite trends [Table 7.5].
7.5.2 EM Side Channel Analysis (EM-SCA) for P-AES
EM emissions from digital gates, on-chip wires, PDN and decoupling capacitances have
been demonstrated to be dependent on intermediate variables [5] and in certain cases carry
more information than power side channel, especially in the presence of countermeasures
[100]. Since our proposed circuits randomize the power consumption of the AES core by
modulating both supply and clock inputs, the EM emanations should also be randomized
leading the reduction in information leakage. This section analyzes and quantifies reduction
in EM side channel leakage with the proposed circuit techniques.
TVLA Analysis
Fig. 7.30 plots t-statistic across filter bands for all systems. The baseline system has large
leakage with peak=99.3 which reduces to 42.1 for DLDO-ENC system. With respect to P-














































Figure 7.31: CR plotted against filter bands for EM-SCA shows similar peak value as P-
SCA for DLDO-ENC-SR system however the highest leaking bands are different.
DLDO-ENC (23.4 vs 42.1) system. For the DLDO-ENC-SR system, the TVLA leakage
further reduces to 12.3 indicating a total reduction of 8.2×. Compared to P-SCA which
only captures side channel leakage through current measured at VIN,DLDO, localized EM-
SCA (near VIN,DLDO) also captures side channel leakage from VSS pins, local PDN (output
of the DLDO) and therefore has significantly higher TVLA peak for the DLDO-ENC sys-
tem. Both SNI and R-VREF randomize supply and clock therefore randomizing the current
drawn from encryption core via VENC which is subsequently discharged to VSS. Therefore,
for the DLDO-ENC-SR system, EM-SCA has comparable peak as P-SCA (12.1 vs 10.3).
CEMA Analysis
Key recovery attacks with respect to CEMA show that both baseline and DLDO-ENC
systems leak across most of the filter bands [Fig. 7.31]. The leakage for the DLDO-
ENC-SR is constrained to only few bands demonstrating similar characteristics as CPA.
However, SR plot in Fig. 7.32 shows that it’s harder to reveal subkeys for the baseline but
easier for the DLDO-ENC-SR system (MTD for 80% SR = 7.2 millions, an increase of
only 136× with respect to baseline for CEMA, much smaller than 4210× observed with
respect to CPA). Both SNI & R-VREF show similar individual trends as observed for CPA


















Figure 7.32: SR plotted against # of measurements shows subkeys are easier to recover
with respect to CEMA than CPA for DLDO-ENC-SR system. However, it still takes 7.2M
measurements to reveal 80% of the subkeys.
7.5.3 Role of Limit Cycle Oscillations (LCO)
Digital LDOs suffer from steady-state limit cycle oscillations (LCO), especially at light
load conditions due to inherent quantization errors of the loop components (ADC and
DAC). Under certain operating conditions (input supply, load current and PID gains), the
DLDO can go into LCO even at slightly higher currents. We reduced the base current
at the output (through load generators) to 5mA to force the DLDO into LCO at different






Figure 7.33: Measured power waveforms at VENC, VIN,DLDO and encryption clock under




































Figure 7.34: Effect of LCO on TVLA leakage time time/freq. domains at light load current
(Ibase ∼ 5mA) and different VENC settings.
tain frequency depending on the LCO mode. With ADCM turned on, both VENC/FENC are
modulated [Fig. 7.33]. Large ripple is added at the output and the pattern of the oscilla-
tions depend on the LCO mode which in turn depends on the operating conditions. Fig.
7.34 shows the reduction in TVLA peak that can be obtained with LCO with higher rip-
ple leading to smaller TVLA leakage. With ADCM, even with very high LCO ripple, the
impact on performance is small (66MHz nominal vs 65.2MHz with LCO for VENC=0.79V,
1.2% degradation) since the mean voltage remains close to nominal voltage. CPA (CEMA)
analysis shows MTD for 80% SR of 3.2 (8) millions in freq. domain for VENC=0.79V.
In summary, LCO shows better (similar) improvement compared to SNI & R-VREF for
TVLA (CPA) but provides much higher resistance for CEMA due to DLDO dominating
the EM emission because of higher ripple.
Table 7.4: TVLA leakage analysis under power injection attacks at VIN,DLDO and VCTRL.
Time/
Freq.
TVLA Leakage under Power Injection Attack (PIA) with Reduced 
Voltage at DLDO Input (VIN,DLDO) and Controller Supply (VCTRL)















Time 10.35 9.9 5.5 9.7 23.6 6.2





















Figure 7.35: Measured power/EM signatures for DLDO-ENC-SR system for (a) S-AES
and (b) SIMON encryption cores. For SIMON core, only initial 3 rounds (3R) of encryption
are shown.
7.5.4 Power Injection Attack (PIA)
A power injection attack (PIA) with a voltage glitch [141] is performed at VCTRL (control
supply that powers the DLDO loop, R-VREF, SNI, and LFSRs), and VIN,DLDO. The PIA
at VCTRL introduced instability/noise at VENC forcing random clock-skipping from ADCM,
which de-synchronizes power/EM signatures [with 100mV glitch TVLA reduced to 5.8
(power) and 7.7 (EM)] but degrades encryption throughput [Table 7.4]. A PIA on VIN,DLDO
can cause all power PMOSs to be always ON, rendering DLDO and R-VREF in-effective,
but SNI remains effective; MTD for 80% SR of 8.4M (power) and 6.0M (EM) are observed
for an 80mV glitch [Table 7.4]. The security of DLDO-ENC can be further improved by
using a TRNG to reduce predictability/repeatability of LFSR and adding input sensing
circuits at VIN,DLDO and VCTRL to inhibit a PIA [141].
7.5.5 Power and EM SCA on S-AES and SIMON
To understand the effectiveness of proposed circuit techniques across algorithms and dat-
apath architectures, SCA is performed on both S-AES and SIMON. Fig. 7.35(a) & (b)
show the measured power/EM signatures for S-AES and SIMON engines respectively for
DLDO-ENC-SR system. Only CPA and CEMA experiments are carried out for S-AES and
































# of Measurements(a) (b)
SCA (SIMON)
Figure 7.36: SR plotted against # of measurements for baseline and proposed systems with
respect to power (P) and EM SCA for (a) S-AES (b) SIMON cores.
Table 7.5: Summary of CPA/CEMA attacks for AES cores for different systems with re-
spect to MTD for 80% SR.
* 80% of the subkeys could not be revealed with given number of measurements. # 






Time Freq. Time Freq.
P-
AES
Baseline 3100 1900 80K 50K
DLDO-ENC 0.68M 0.32M 0.84M 0.36M
DLDO-ENC-S 4.2M 2.4M >5M* (7) 3.6M
DLDO-ENC-R >5M* (7) 3.6M >5M* (4) 4.4M
DLDO-ENC-SR >10M* (7) 8M >10M* (11) 6.8M
S-
AES
Baseline 5000 3300 >200K* (7) 140K
DLDO-ENC 1M* (6) 0.96M >1M* (2) 0.88M
DLDO-ENC-S >5M* (11) 3.6M >5M* (7) 3M
DLDO-ENC-R >5M* (2) 4M >5M* (1) 3.8M
DLDO-ENC-SR >10M* (9) 7.4M >10M* (4) 7.2M
SCA on S-AES
For P-SCA, MTD for 80% SR for the baseline system is 3300 which increases to 0.96
millions for DLDO-ENC (291×) and 7.4 millions for DLDO-ENC-SR (2242×) systems
[Fig. 7.36(a)] [Table 7.5]. For EM-SCA, MTD for 80% SR for the baseline system is
140000 which increases to 0.88 millions for DLDO-ENC (an increase of only 6.3× over
baseline ) and 7.2 millions for DLDO-ENC-SR (an increase of only 51.4× over baseline)
systems [Fig. 7.36(a)].
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Table 7.6: Summary of improvement in SCA resistance (with respect to MTD for 80% SR)
for AES & SIMON with the proposed countermeasure.















Time 3100 >10M 5000 >10M 8200 5.2M
Freq. 1900 8M 3300 7.4M 1600 1.2M
CEMA
Time 80K >10M >200K >10M >200K 2.8M
Freq. 50K 6.8M 140K 7.2M 20K 0.8M
SCA on SIMON
For P-SCA, MTD for 80% SR for the baseline system is 1600 which increases to 1.2
millions for DLDO-ENC-SR (750×) system [Table 7.6] [Fig. 7.36(b)]. For EM-SCA,
MTD for 80% SR for the baseline system is 20000 which increases to 0.8 millions for
DLDO-ENC-SR (an increase of only 40× over baseline) system.
Discussion on SCA Improvement for Different Encryption Cores
Table 7.6 summarizes the CPA/CEMA analysis results with respect to SR for baseline and
proposed countermeasure for P-AES, S-AES and SIMON cores in time and freq. domain.
For cases where 80% subkeys could not be recovered, number of subkeys recovered with
given number of measurements are presented (out of 16 for P-AES and S-AES, out of 32
for SIMON). When we compare the two AES cores, MTD for 80% SR for both AES cores
shows similar trends for either baseline (3300 for S-AES vs 1900 for P-AES) or DLDO-
ENC-SR (7.4 millions for S-AES vs 8 millions for P-AES) systems with respect to CPA.
Intermediate systems as well as CEMA analysis show more or less similar trends. When
we analyze the leakage behavior for SIMON vs AES cores, we see very different results
for DLDO-ENC-SR system. Only 1.2 million measurements are required for revealing
80% subkeys for SIMON vs 8 million measurements required for P-AES with respect to
CPA (similar trends for CEMA). This difference in side channel leakage characteristics
can be attributed to two different factors- 1) hardware architecture and 2) choice of leakage
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models. Both AES cores are implemented in such a way that for each subkey, leakage is
generated only when that subkey is used in the datapath in ”a single cycle”. For SIMON,
due to use of shift registers [Fig. 3.4], the computed sensitive bit is shifted through each
flip-flop in the shift-register generating leakage in 64 clock cycles increasing probability
of successful attack. Another reason for reduced impact of proposed countermeasure for
SIMON is the choice of leakage model. For SIMON, 1-bit models are chosen compared to
8-bit models for AES cores. 1-bit power models have been shown to be more effective in
certain cases [144].
7.5.6 Overhead Analysis for the Proposed Countermeasure
For overhead analysis, only P-AES core has been considered. Design overheads are dis-
cussed as follows:
Area Overheads
The total silicon area for P-AES is 0.275 mm2. The proposed countermeasure consumes
0.101 mm2 including DLDO, SNI, R-VREF and ADCM circuits (total 36.9% of P-AES
area). For DLDO, the area for power-stage, ADC, and controller are included.
Performance Overheads
DLDO-ENC system is designed to run at the same freq. as the baseline system indicating
no performance loss. For DLDO-ENC-SR system, R-VREF scheme is designed such that
an average system throughput (same as baseline system) is maintained over long period of
time therefore resulting in very small performance loss (1.1%). SNI incurs an additional
9.3% and therefore total performance loss is only 10.4%.
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Area 36.9%b 1%c 6.6%c 25% 33% 104%
Power 32%b 5%c 3.5%c 30% 20% -
Perf. 10.4% 3.33% 17.4% 0% 50% 0%






Time/Freq. Domain Time, Freq. Time, Freq. Time, Freq. Time Time Time












Attack Mode Power, EM Power, EM Power, EM Power Power Power, EM
aWith respect to parallel AES (P-AES). bIncludes DLDO regulator area/power.       cDoesn’t include regulator area/power.        
dFor P-AES.                                                                    eRelative correlation based analysis.               fMinimum of CPA MTD and CEMA MTD.   
gSCA performed for only 1 byte.                                  hMTD to disclose all bytes.                               iNone of the bytes could be disclosed. 
Power Overheads
Measured power consumption for baseline P-AES is 10.9mW at 80MHz, 0.84V. For DLDO-
ENC-SR system, assuming total load current of ∼ 40mA, DLDO provides 68% power-
efficiency when SNI and R-VREF circuits are enabled with ADCM indicating a power loss
of 32%.
Comparison with Prior Works
Comparison with prior work is presented in Table 7.7 with focus on circuit/logic-level
countermeasures, similar in nature to this work. For comparison, minimum MTD for 80%
SR across CPA/CEMA is used assuming an adversary can perform both CPA/CEMA. The
proposed countermeasure achieve 3579×, 2182× and 500× increase in MTD for 80%
SR across CPA & CEMA for P-AES, S-AES and SIMON cores respectively. Unlike the
prior work in [128][141], the proposed countermeasure doesn’t require any large passives
and unlike [100], it can randomize signatures even during the same encryption achieving
greater SCA resistance. The proposed countermeasure can also be integrated with other




There are two aspects to the proposed countermeasure- 1) SCA resistance offered by a
nominal digital LDO and 2) additional improvement with proposed SNI and R-VREF cir-
cuits in conjuction with ADCM. A nominal DLDO [Fig. 7.2] as discussed in Section II
suppresses side channel leakage by attenuating small signal signatures and by adding large
signal distortions. In our implementation, DLDO small signal behavior is dominated by the
load pole and effectively acts as a LPF. This load pole is located at 16.7MHZ (IL = 31mA,
VIN,DLDO = 1V - ∆VPCB = 1V - 31mA × 1Ω , VOUT = 0.84V, VDO = VIN,DLDO - VOUT,
Rpower-stage = VDO/IL = 4.16 Ω, CL=2.3nF, FL = 16.7MHz), where ∆VPCB is the voltage drop
across the 1Ω PCB resistor used for capturing power signatures). Since FL is very small,
high freq. signatures, specifically in the proximity of encryption clock frequency (FENC)
are attenuated. Assuming 1st order system, a LPF with F3dB of 16.7MHz has approximately
4.9× attenuation at 80MHz. This will lead to signal attenuation of 4.9× at 80MHz which
in turn reduce SNR by the same amount. Since MTD = 1
SNR2
[99], we expect to see
24× increase in MTD due to small signal attenuation for frequencies in the proximity of
the clock frequency, however, low frequency components which have been shown to be
prominent leaking component with respect to SCA will not be affected by this attenuation.
Therefore, small signal attenuation through digital LDO is not the primary reason for the
increase in MTD [also demonstrated with respect to power gate and decoupling capaci-
tance experiments in Section 5.4.1, Fig. 7.27, which essentially acts as a LPF comprising
of decoupling capacitance (0.4nF or 2.3nF) and test-control switch resistance (2.36Ω) giv-
ing F3dB of 169MHz or 29.3MHz for 0.4nF or 2.3nF decoupling capacitance]. Therefore,
improvement in SCA resistance across the entire frequency spectrum for a nominal DLDO
has to come from large signal distortions as described in Fig. 7.4(c).
SNI and R-VREF circuits when enabled with nominal DLDO improve the SCA resis-
tance as demonstrated in previous sections. For SNI, we saw that increasing pulse width
increases the amount of noise added and therefore reduces the SCA leakage. However,
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when LFSR2 is used to increase the randomness by switching among 3 different pulse
widths pseudo-randomly, the SCA leakage observed is more than with the highest possible
pulse width. Therefore, we can surmise that pulse width is more important than its ran-
domization. I’d like to note that some amount of randomness is already added as DLDO
and encryption clocks are asynchronous. With SNI operated on DLDO clock, the relation
between the location of SNI pulse with respect to encryption clock is already random. For
R-VREF, the amount of randomness/noise added depends on the range of reference words
(and therefore range of VENC). A higher range not only increases the noise added in the sup-
ply voltage but also increases the range of output clock frequencies generated by ADCM
circuit. Since we are limited by the dynamic range of DLDO in the current testchip, the
range of R-VREF in any future testchip should be designed to maximize the randomness
added.
To break the proposed countermeasure, we not only needed to increase the number of
measurements acquired to 10 million, we had to employ extensive filtering scheme utiliz-
ing narrow bandpass filters. Since we are using 31 bandpass filters (30 narrow and 1 wide)
and are performing analysis in both time and frequency domains, we are spending approx-
imately 2×31 = 62× more time on the analysis compared to a more traditional analysis
method which only analyzes measurements in time domain using at most one bandpass
filter centered around FENC. To reduce the analysis time, we can either run all the iterations
in parallel using CPU clusters or employ a more efficient filtering scheme using a profiling
step [137]. Moreover, more advanced attack methods such as template attacks [14], ma-
chine learning [145], deep learning [146, 147] can be employed to tackle poor SNR in the
captured traces. Also, leakage models can be improved by using a linear regression method
[148, 149] on the 8-bit power models for AES cores. Moreover, blind source separation
can also be used to improve SNR in the measured signatures [150].
To remove the impact of frequency randomization, leakage power analysis (LPA) [136]
can also be employed as a future work as LPA is only dependent on the current state of the
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circuit in the steady state (when no operations are happening) and supply voltage but not
dependent on the frequency of operation.
To improve the SCA resistance offered by proposed countermeasure, in addition to in-
creasing the range of SNI and R-VREF, noise can directly be injected at VIN,DLDO. The
signatures that are captured at VIN,DLDO are already attenuated and a small amount of ran-
dom noise can further suppress the available signal [81].
7.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrated enhanced power/EM SCA resistance of AES and SIMON en-
cryption engines using a security-aware DLDO integrated with SNI & R-VREF circuits.
With SCA analysis performed on power/EM signatures captured from a testchip fabri-
cated in 130nm CMOS, we show that TVLA leakage is reduced by a factor of 25× for
P-AES. Morever, CPA/CEMA analysis demonstrate that MTD for 80% SR increases by
a factor of 3579×, 2182× and 500× for P-AES, S-AES and SIMON cores respectively
at 10.4% performance, 32% power and 36.9% area overheads, indicating the generic and
low-complexity nature of the proposed countermeasure.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With modern computing devices taking over every aspect of human life, from high perfor-
mance computing systems to billions of network-connected devices, energy-efficiency and
security have become the biggest challenges to a address to ensure continued growth. This
thesis investigates circuit techniques and architectures for improved energy-efficiency and
SCA resistance for different cryptographic algorithms. Different datapath architectures for
lightweight block cipher SIMON are developed and characterized with respect to ASIC
and FPGA implementations to demonstrate energy-optimal and side channel resistant op-
eration when the optimized SIMON engine is integrated with a low-power image sensor
node. Since SCA resistance achieved with choice of datapath implementation is not suffi-
cient, several lightweight SCA countermeasures utlilizing on-chip power management and
low-power techniques are developed for 128-bit SIMON engine as well as for 128-bit AES
cores. The detailed architecture for FIVR and DLDO integrated with ADCM circuit is pre-
sented to enable simultaneous supply and clock modulation for improved resistance against
power, EM and fault based side channel attacks. Since all of these blocks are already inte-
grated on-chip to facilitate fine-grained power management and error-free operation, they
can also be leveraged to provide SCA resistance, using the techniques presented in this
dissertation, making them an attractive option compared to most of the existing counter-
measures. This chapter summarizes the main contributions in Section 8.1 and discusses
future work and research directions in Section 8.2.
8.1 Dissertation Summary
We first establish the measurement and side channel analysis methodology in Chapter
3. Some of the commonly used metrics used for SCA methodology such as MTD for CPA
143
and CEMA analysis, SNR and t-statistic for TVLA analysis are described along with newly
introduced correlation ratio (CR) and success rate (SR) metrics. Datapath architectures for
128-bit SIMON and 128-bit P-AES and S-AES cores used as encryption core prototype for
FPGA and ASIC experiments in subsequent chapters are presented.
Chapter 4 highlights the need for lightweight cryptography in the context of IoT en-
vironment and how recently introduced lightweight cipher SIMON can address the chal-
lenges of resource constraints in these environments. Several datapath architectures for
128-bit SIMON at bit-level and round-level parallelism are implemented on ASIC using
freePDK 15nm CMOS process and it is shown that 6-round unrolled datapath not only
provides minimal energy operation (80× better) but also improves the SCA resistance by
atleast 384× (characterized on Sakura-G FPGA board) while offering 143× increase in
performance compared to bitserial implementation, demonstrating that bitserial datapaths,
even though the most compact, are not optimal when other important tradeoffs such as en-
ergy, performance and SCA resistance are considered. Application of optimized SIMON
architectures to a low-power image sensor node shows negligible overheads associated
with integrating SCA hardened encryption engine with the IoT edge node facilitating both
mathematical and side channel security.
Different datapath architectures are susceptible to side channel attacks to a different
degree with parallel and round-unrolled datapaths due to algorithmic noise have reduced
information leakage compared to serialized datapaths as demonstrated for SIMON in pre-
vious chapter and also true for hardware implementations of AES. However, the improve-
ment in SCA resistance inherent to datapath implementation is not sufficient and dedicated
countermeasures are required to further harden the encryption cores. Subsequent chapters
discuss several circuit techniques that leverage on-chip power management and employ ad-
ditional hiding or randomization circuits to further improve physical side channel defenses.
Chapter 5 describes Random Fast Voltage Dithering (RFVD) scheme developed using
on-chip integrated FIVR and ADCM circuit to provide SCA resistance for 128-bit AES
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cores at their local supply node (VAES). With RFVD, both power and EM signatures are
scrambled owing to 1) 6 different randomized operating conditions (voltage and frequency -
V-F) across encryptions, 2) local modulator (LM) inducing randomness with random clock
gating and duty modulation, 3) global modulator based frequency randomization (GM-FR)
and 4) FIVR loop randomizer (LR) adding randomness at VAES. Proposed randomization
schemes randomize both amplitude and timing of signals in side channel signatures and
result in misalignment of time samples and reduced SNR leading to increase in SCA resis-
tance. The P-SCA measurements taken from 130nm CMOS testchip prototype demonstrate
reduction of upto 37.3× in TVLA leakage and increase of 642× in CPA MTD. Since pro-
posed techniques scramble both power/EM signatures, similar resistance is observed for
SCA hardened design with respect to P-SCA and EM-SCA.
Since ADCM circuit enables error-free operation in presence of supply fluctuations or
process or temperature variations, it can be used to protect against supply glitch or tem-
perate variations induced faults. Chapter 6 develops a simple measurement setup, by
integrating testchip prototype and Sakura-G FPGA board, to inject supply glitch or temper-
ature fluctuation related faults during encryption operation for S-AES core. A successful
fault injection attack is demonstrated for unprotected (standalone) S-AES core under dif-
ferent settings for induced supply glitches. For protected S-AES core (S-AES+ADCM),
we can no longer inject these faults even with 10 million encryptions indicating usefulness
of ADCM to mitigate fault injection attacks.
Due to high design complexity and silicon area for FIVR, RFVD scheme that was
proposed in Chapter 5 may not be suitable for ultra-lightweight IoT edge devices. To ad-
dress this, lightweight SCA countermeasures utilizing digital LDO and ADCM circuits are
developed in Chapter 7. Different transformations that are induced through DLDO into
power signatures before they are measured at the input supply node of the chip (VIN,DLDO)
are discussed. Small signal attenuation and large signal distortions are shown to be ma-
jor contributors to information loss. However, a nominal DLDO provides only a limited
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improvement and two circuit techniques, namely switching noise injector (SNI) and Ran-
dom VREF generator (R-VREF) are presented to further improve the SCA resistance. A
testchip prototype containing these circuits, AES and SIMON cores is developed in 130nm
CMOS and measured results demonstrate improved SCA resistance (in terms of MTD for
80% SR) by a factor of 3579×, 2182× and 500× for P-AES, S-AES and SIMON cores re-
spectively with respect to both P-SCA and EM-SCA. The design overheads associated with
proposed hardening circuits are 10.4% performance, 32% power and 36.9% area indicating
their generic and low-complexity nature. In summary, we demonstrate that a security-aware
digital LDO can not only provide point of load regulation but also facilitate point of load
side channel security.
8.2 Future Directions
Since power and EM based side channels are created due to sudden current drawn by the
digital circuits, techniques to lower power consumption affect side channel characteristics.
Therefore, power-management and low-power circuit techniques which are already em-
ployed on-chip for distributed power management systems can be leveraged to improve
SCA resistance facilitating energy-efficient and secure computing as demonstrated by this
thesis and some other recently published work [48, 60, 81, 151].
8.2.1 Energy, Security and Performance Tradeoffs
Even though the proposed circuits suppress information leakage, tradeoffs among energy,
security and performance are inherent. A high bandwidth FIVR/DLDO can provide better
DVFS management therefore improving performance or reducing energy but it may lead
to higher information leakage as high frequency signal in the encryption signatures pass
through FIVR/DLDO without significant attenuation. For the proposed R-VREF circuit,
correct clock edges are generated even during the supply voltage transitions and encryption
engine operates normally. A faster transition means supply voltage is at a number of fixed
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levels (depending on the number of reference words) most of the time generating a number
of fixed frequency levels. However, a slower transition means higher number of frequency
levels generated corresponding to instantaneous voltage during the transition. The number
of generated frequency levels depend not only on the range of the transition but also the
speed or slew rate. Therefore, a smaller bandwidth FIVR/DLDO may potentially improve
the SCA resistance by not only only suppressing the high frequency side channel signa-
tures but also by increasing the number of instantaneous V-F pairs generated. On the other
hand, a high bandwidth DLDO may be better for leakage suppression with respect to SNI
as DLDO quickly responds to noise events as a result of SNI generating more noise. The
interaction between SNI, R-VREF and DLDO parameters (bandwidth and phase margin) is
complex and has to be carefully analyzed/measured to improve the proposed countermea-
sures for higher SCA resistance.
8.2.2 Compute Complexity and Ideas to Improve Proposed Techniques
While quantifying the improvement in side channel leakage, we employed extensive filter-
ing techniques with upto 100 filter bands for RFVD and upto 30 filter bands for DLDO with
SNI & R-VREF countermeasures. Traditionally, only one or no filter band is employed for
filtering. Therefore, with our postprocessing methods, the analysis time increases by a
factor of 100× or 30 × for RFVD and DLDO with SNI & R-VREF respectively. Even
though this increased analysis time is not included in the MTD metric, it will significantly
increase the difficulty to recover the secret key with respect to increased time or compute
and memory complexity. To reduce filter bands, we can use a profiling step first to figure
out the most leaking band and then use that to recover the secret key for unknown devices.
Proposed techniques, including RFVD with FIVR & ADCM and SNI/R-VREF with
DLDO & ADCM, essentially rely on randomization of signatures. However, this random-
ization is achieved using pseudorandom number generators implemented on-chip using
LFSR. Since LFSR follows a deterministic pattern, it may be possible to detect the LFSR
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pattern using pattern matching/detection techniques. Another drawback is the range of
LFSR. We are using 2-5 bit LFSRs which have limited randomization range. By increasing
the range, it may be possible to increase the extent of signal randomization, especially for
R-VREF where increased number of reference words will increase the number and range of
supply and frequency levels generated. Similarly, by increasing the width of SNI pulse out,
we can disconnect the leakage path from VENC to VIN,DLDO for longer fraction of DLDO
clock cycle. We may need to increase the load capacitor (CL) to contain the injected noise
within some pre-determined level.
8.2.3 Advanced Power Models and Attack Methods
Traditional hamming distance (HD) or hamming weight (HW) based power models only
model the switching activity at the intermediate nodes. They don’t model the other parts
of the power consumption - supply, frequency and intermediate node capacitances as these
are assumed to be fixed throughout the experiment. With the proposed techniques, the
assumption about intermediate node capacitance is still correct, however, supply voltage
and frequency vary during the experiment, in fact, from encryption to encryption and even
during the same encryption. Therefore, a better hypothetical power model would model
both of these for increased accuracy, especially for DVFS or DVS based countermeasures
[44, 82]. However, since, voltage and frequency are changed randomly across different and
even during the same encryptions in this work, it may not be possible to know supply and
frequency of operation.
Since proposed countermeasures add amplitude and timing noise leading to reduced
SNR, techniques to improve SNR can be employed to improve attack results. Filtering
schemes and frequency domain attacks try to achieve this to some extent but better meth-
ods such as blind source separation [152] or linear regression [153] based statistical meth-
ods can be used to improve SNR. Additionally, higher order attacks, such as template
attacks [14] or machine learning/deep learning [146, 154] attacks can potentially reduce
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the number of measurements required to recover the correct key. However, some of these
techniques are not robust to increased noise in the captured signatures so the proposed
countermeasure are expected to perform well.
8.2.4 Application to Other Cryptographic Algorithms
Application of the proposed countermeasures to other cryptographic algorithms, especially
public key cryptographic alogirhtms, may not have the same impact as demonstrated for
SIMON and AES cores. Compared to symmetric key encryption schemes, public key en-
cryption schemes, suchs as RSA and ECC run for 100s of thousands of cycles and leak
signatures over a longer period (side channel leakage in low-frequency bands). The pro-
posed DLDO has a bandwidth of∼10MHz indicating sub-10MHz signals will not have any
small signal attenuation at all. Therefore, a nominal DLDO may not affect the side channel
leakage of these algorithms significantly. However, the proposed SNI and R-VREF circuits
add both high-frequency and low-frequency noise and more importantly, the asynchronous
relation between DLDO clock and encryption clock adds timing noise which will help in







ADCM All Digital Clock Modulation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
B-RFVD Basic Random Fast Voltage Dithering
CPA Correlation Power Analysis
CEMA Correlation ElectroMagnetic Analysis
CR Correlation Ratio
DLDO Digital Low Drop-Out




FFT Fast Fourier Transform
FIA Fault Injection Attack
FIVR Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulator
GM Global Modulator
GM-FR Global Modulator based Frequency Randomization
HD Hamming Distance
HW Hamming Weight
I-RFVD Improved Random Fast Voltage Dithering
IoT Internet of Things
IVR Integrated Voltage Regulator
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LCO Limit Cycle Oscillation
LDO Low Dropout Regulator
LM Local Modulator
LPF Low Pass Filter






R-VREF Randomized VREF Generator
RFVD Random Fast Voltage Dithering
RTA Resistive-Transient-Assist
S-AES Serial AES
SCVR Switched-Capacitor based Voltage Regulator
SCA Side Channel Attack
SNI Switching Noise Injector
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio
SR Success Rate
TA Template Attack
TVLA Test Vector Leakage Assessment
UGF Unity-Gain-Bandwidth
VR(M) Voltage Regulator (Module)
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Christof Paar. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 29–45.
ISBN: 978-3-540-36400-9.
[6] Peng Cheng et al. “SonarSnoop: Active Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks”. In: CoRR
abs/1808.10250 (2018). arXiv: 1808.10250.
[7] Paul Kocher et al. “Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution”. In: 40th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P’19). 2019.
[8] Moritz Lipp et al. “Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space”. In: 27th
USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18). 2018.
[9] Michael Schwarz et al. “ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling”.
In: arXiv:1905.05726 (2019).
[10] F. Liu et al. “Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical”. In: 2015 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy. 2015, pp. 605–622.
[11] Galen Hunt, George Letey, and Ed Nightingale. The Seven Properties of Highly
Secure Devices. Tech. rep. MSR-TR-2017-16. 2017.
153
[12] Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun. “Differential Power Analysis”. In:
Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 99. Ed. by Michael Wiener. Berlin, Heidel-
berg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999, pp. 388–397. ISBN: 978-3-540-48405-9.
[13] Eric Brier, Christophe Clavier, and Francis Olivier. “Correlation Power Analysis
with a Leakage Model”. In: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -
CHES 2004. Ed. by Marc Joye and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 16–29. ISBN: 978-3-540-28632-5.
[14] Suresh Chari, Josyula R. Rao, and Pankaj Rohatgi. “Template Attacks”. In: Crypto-
graphic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2002. Ed. by Burton S. Kaliski,
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Çetin K. Koç, and Christof Paar. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2003, pp. 77–88. ISBN: 978-3-540-45238-6.
[90] T. Fukunaga and J. Takahashi. “Practical Fault Attack on a Cryptographic LSI with
ISO/IEC 18033-3 Block Ciphers”. In: 2009 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tol-
erance in Cryptography (FDTC). 2009, pp. 84–92.
[91] Adrian Tang, Simha Sethumadhavan, and Salvatore Stolfo. “CLKSCREW: Expos-
ing the Perils of Security-Oblivious Energy Management”. In: 26th USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (USENIX Security 17). Vancouver, BC: USENIX Association,
2017, pp. 1057–1074. ISBN: 978-1-931971-40-9.
[92] A. Barenghi et al. “Fault Injection Attacks on Cryptographic Devices: Theory, Prac-
tice, and Countermeasures”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE 100.11 (2012), pp. 3056–
3076.
161
[93] Chih-Hsu Yen and Bing-Fei Wu. “Simple error detection methods for hardware im-
plementation of Advanced Encryption Standard”. In: IEEE Transactions on Com-
puters 55.6 (2006), pp. 720–731.
[94] B. Wang et al. “Exploration of Benes Network in Cryptographic Processors: A
Random Infection Countermeasure for Block Ciphers Against Fault Attacks”. In:
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 12.2 (2017), pp. 309–
322.
[95] Kamil Gomina et al. “Detecting Positive Voltage Attacks on CMOS Circuits”. In:
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Cryptography and Security in Computing
Systems. CS2 ’14. Vienna, Austria: ACM, 2014, pp. 1–6. ISBN: 978-1-4503-2484-
7.
[96] K. Gomina et al. “Power supply glitch attacks: Design and evaluation of detection
circuits”. In: 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security
and Trust (HOST). 2014, pp. 136–141.
[97] L. Zussa et al. “Efficiency of a glitch detector against electromagnetic fault injec-
tion”. In: 2014 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE).
2014, pp. 1–6.
[98] EMC Probes. “Accessed: Feb. 19, 2018. Available: https://www.beehive-electronics
.com/datasheets/100SeriesDatasheetCurrent.pdf”. In: Online.
[99] Y. Souissi L. Sauvage S. Guilley H. Maghrebi and J.-L. Danger. “Quantifying the
quality of side channel acquisitions”. In: 2017 IEEE International Solid-State Cir-
cuits Conference (ISSCC). 2011.
[100] A. Singh et al. “Improved Power/EM Side-Channel Attack Resistance of 128-Bit
AES Engines With Random Fast Voltage Dithering”. In: IEEE Journal of Solid-
State Circuits 54.2 (2019), pp. 569–583.
[101] A. Singh et al. “Energy Efficient and Side-Channel Secure Cryptographic Hardware
for IoT-Edge Nodes”. In: IEEE Internet of Things Journal 6.1 (2019), pp. 421–434.
[102] Akashi Satoh et al. “A Compact Rijndael Hardware Architecture with S-Box Op-
timization”. In: Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT 2001. Ed. by Colin Boyd.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001, pp. 239–254. ISBN: 978-3-
540-45682-7.
[103] A. Singh et al. “Energy efficient and side-channel secure hardware architecture for
lightweight cipher SIMON”. In: 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware
Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). 2018, pp. 159–162.
162
[104] P. Yalla and J. Kaps. “Lightweight Cryptography for FPGAs”. In: 2009 Interna-
tional Conference on Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs. 2009, pp. 225–230.
[105] Christophe De Cannière, Orr Dunkelman, and Miroslav Knežević. “KATAN and
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